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Testing the Theory of the Penetrated Political System in Central Asia

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Introduction

The penetrated political system theory has been a method for understanding relationships within the comparative politics field. Most recently, the penetrated political system theory has been applied to the Middle East, and the findings support that the Middle East region is the only region in which the political systems have been penetrated. Much like the Middle East in the last century, Central Asia has become the center of multi-faceted concerns of the international and regional forces in large part due to the heightened concern over terrorist threats and the growing consumption of petroleum. Although the growth in interest by regional and international powers may have some beneficial elements for development, the speed and number of powers centering their interests within the region may also have devastating effects surrounding the already shaky stability of the region. It is with this understanding that, despite being so soon after their independence, it is important to apply the penetrated political system theory to these three countries in order to determine if Central Asia is already or will be following in the footsteps of the neighboring Middle East region.

In light of these findings, I propose a look into another region with a wide range of similarities. That region is Central Asia, most notably Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. This paper will focus upon Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan as case studies for the region because these three represent a broad and diverse sampling of the region which will highlight the progression since regional independence from the former Soviet Union, as well give a well rounded understanding of current condition and standing of the region. It is through these three countries that economic, military, social, and geopolitical indicators can be best tested in

order to have a clear understanding as to whether or not the Central Asian states have had their political systems penetrated.

Research Design

Hypothesis

Hypothesis 1:

If there is presence of multiple-nonmembers influence in the economy, military, social cohesion, and strategic vulnerability at all levels of political systems within Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, than the political systems of these three countries are penetrated.

Hypothesis 0:

There is no relationship between the nonmember actors and influence and the political systems within Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

Sub-hypothesis 1

H1

The economic system of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are influenced by multiple nonmembers.

H2

The military of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are influenced by multiple nonmembers.

H3

The social cohesion of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are influenced by multiple nonmembers.

H4

The strategic vulnerability of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are influenced by multiple nonmembers.

H0

There is no relationship between the economic-political level, military, social cohesion and strategic vulnerability of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan and the multiple nonmembers.

Theory

The hypotheses stated above are based out of my research. The first hypothesis and its null are derived directly out of the literature, which suggests that the key to determining if the penetrated political system theory applies to Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. One of the best ways to test the penetrated political system applicableness to the Central Asian region is to highlight a sample of the region that shows some of the most varied cases within the region. For the purposes of this study, Kazakhstan, the largest and most resource rich in the region, Tajikistan, the smallest and with its recent civil war¹, is a unique case for testing for penetration, and Uzbekistan, medium size and shares borders with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. The definition of penetration and the penetrated political system theory, as well as the four indicators are debated concepts by scholars of comparative and international politics, which will fully addressed within the literature review.

The hypothesis suggests that when the conditions satisfy the presence of multiple nonmember influence than the conclusion that there is penetrated political system is supported. The determining factor for the purpose of this hypothesis is various aspects of the political system for each country, as well as the furthest extent into which the political system is penetrated: vertical movement down the chain of system, with emphasis on the domestic, national and international. However, if the indicators are not satisfied, and the influence is not reflected at all levels of the political system, than the penetrated political system theory is not supported.

¹ Despite the fact that the Tajikistan civil war occurred from 1994 to 1997, which is outside of hypothesized timeframe, the remnants of the civil war and its peace agreement of 1997 still play a very active role within the political system, unlike any of the other Central Asian states.

As for the sub-hypotheses, these are indicators given by one of the political scientists to help determine when a political system has been penetrated. So, on the individual level of the three states the indicators will be tested in order to give a fuller picture of the region. However, this does appear to leave the paper open to the possibility of inconsistent conclusions to the main hypothesis. In the case that three of the sub-hypotheses prove to support the null or the main hypothesis than the conclusion will be made that the hypothesis with the majority of the sub-hypotheses will be deemed as fully supported by the indicators. The economy, the military, social cohesion, and strategic vulnerability are four primary concerns of any political system, and have basis at various levels within the system. These four indicators help determine the extent and the depth of the penetration.

Data

The statistical data that will be used for this paper comes from program MicroCase ExplorIt: Student Version 4.7 composed by Michael K. Le Roy.² The data will range between the years of 1998 and 2008, because 1998 is a good indicator for the course the region was experiencing prior to September 11, 2001. The year 2008 is the most recent date in order to accurately track the extent of the impact the events following September 11 have had on the region. Also, data charts from the Energy Information Administration, the United Nations Human Development Index, and reliable texts used

² The ExplorIt program and an in depth look at its applications are furthered explained within Le Roy's Comparative Politics: Using Microcase ExplorIt, fourth edition (Thomson Wadsworth, US, 2007). For the purposes of this paper, each piece of data from the ExplorIt program will be accompanied with an explanation of its relevance.

for this research will be used in order to fill in the gaps wherever present in ExplorIt program. Where statistical data is unable to explain the causes or the consequences, than cases studies will be used. For some of the indicators, the statistical data is inefficient and therefore empirical data in the form of in depth case studies must be used in order to satisfy the research in determining which of the hypotheses is supported.

Use of Data

In order to support the main hypothesis, there are four sub-hypotheses which are derived from four indicators: economic dependence, military weakness, lack of social cohesion, and strategic vulnerability.

Economic dependence within this paper will mean that the internal economic and financial structures within a penetrated political system rely primarily upon outside actors, and are greatly influenced by regional and/or global markets, which make the internal structures completely vulnerable to these markets and actors. In order to examine this indicator, I will be looking at the statistical data and case studies that measure the amount of foreign aid and investment from outside governmental agencies and non-governmental agencies within Central Asia's energy sector and infrastructure, and track the Gross Domestic Product of the three countries to determine the vulnerability of the economic systems in relation to the fluctuations of regional and global markets within the three assigned countries.

Military weakness, for the purpose of this paper, will not be solely based upon whether a military is present within a country. Military weakness will be related to the

effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of the military forces within Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to maintain national and regional security. In order to determine the military status of these three countries I will examine the statistical data that measures the amount of reliance upon other state military forces and governments for technology, adequate supplies (such as weapons, armor, and vehicles), training, and coalitions engaged in joint security ventures within the region. I will examine closely the military relations of these three countries with other state actors and international organizations, and the nature of these relationships by using a few case studies. All of my examinations will be kept in the context of before and after September 11 and the War in Afghanistan.

Social cohesion will be determined not by the homogeneousness of a country, or a governmental imposed identity, but rather the free and stable exchanges of a multiethnic society that create and support a national identity. In order to examine social cohesion and to determine if there is a lack thereof, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan will be broken down into case studies supported by statistical data to look at the government structures of each country, and the direct influence of other state actors and international organizations. Each review of the government structures will look at the types of government, how many ethnic groups are represented in the government, voter turn-out, civil society and grass root organizations, and the protection of freedoms.

Lastly, the strategic vulnerability of the region in the geopolitics of regional and global state actors and international organizations will be reviewed by a combination of a case study for the historical and current importance of the region for regional/global military strategic value with regards to the current war on terrorism and intraregional border security. Strategic vulnerability will be established if the diplomatic relations of

neighboring or regional states and the global community are made for Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and/or Uzbekistan by another country.

Literature Review

When it comes to the penetrated political system theory, there are three main schools of thought: all states are penetrated and penetrate one another on usually a one on one basis, small states are primarily penetrated by larger, more capable states and it varies how many other states are penetrating; and in order to be considered a penetrated political system multiple states must be acting at the same time and the only region that has experienced full penetration is the Middle East.

According to James N. Rosenau, the concept of the penetrated political system is an attempt to merge comparative politics and international politics in order to formulate a more accurate account of state political systems and their interactions with other political systems. Understanding the political system of any state, except for the most isolated and disconnected states, needs to be more than just looking at the internal functions and actors. In this modern age of “internationalization,” or interconnection, there is no way to accurately study a state’s political system without incorporating the international element.

First, Rosenau assesses the concept of “international accommodative capability,” as described in his critique of Gabriel Almond’s theory. “All national systems (with the possible exception of genuinely isolated oceanic island communities) are posited as possessing such a capability, and consequently “all political systems somehow cope”

with the international environment.”³ If a country lacks the “accommodative capacity” to maintain its political system while being apart of the international system, then it is very unlikely that the system will continue to exist as is within the state structure. At the same time, it is the states with the accommodative capacity that are able to be a part of the international system, weather the influences, and maintain a political system that is unique to its state structure.

Almond’s theory helps illustrate that political systems need a coping mechanism in which to handle the international system, but the theory does not allow a state’s political system to be changing or to have multiple layers to its existence especially when concerning the societal interactions. Rosenau breaks down the political structure into the “subnational, national, and supranational elements.”⁴ The subnational is relative to the domestic and local governmental and political exchanges, the national refers to the central political body if present, and the subnational is the regional and international exchanges that a state engages in. This breaking down of the political system allows for a thorough review of any international component or nonmember actors, and their influence upon the system.

It is these nonmember actors and international components are not so much a coping mechanism but a way for the subnational and national levels of government to be influenced and integrated into the international system. “These nonmembers not only exert influence upon national systems but actually participate in the processes through which such systems allocate values, coordinate goal-directed efforts, and legitimately

³ Rosenau, James N, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy: Essays on the Analysis of World Politics, revised edition, Nichols Publishing Company, New York, 1980: 142

⁴ Rosenau: 146

employ coercion”⁵ It is because of these nonmember actors spreading their influence within the multiple layers of the government, that Rosenau would call a state’s government a penetrated political system. “A penetrated political system is one in which nonmembers of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society’s members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals.”⁶

In order to determine whether or not a political system has been penetrated, Rosenau offers up four indicators that are characteristic of shortages in capabilities in which to avoid the influence nonmember’s influence, and are the most exploited and taken advantage of by nonmembers. The four indicators are of an economic kind, such as a state receiving foreign aid, military weakness, lack of social cohesion, and an overall strategic vulnerability.⁷ Although Rosenau does not offer up clear definitions for these indicators, he does present the idea that these indicators would be perceivable at all three layers of the political system,⁸ and that the nature of these indicators are likely to become permanent within the political system.

Jeanne A. K. Hey, a political scientist interested in small states, adapted Rosenau’s penetrated political system theory in order to give it a more specified context, because Rosenau left the theory open to every and all states that are a part of the international system to be considered and treated like a penetrated system. Hey narrowed the context of Rosenau’s theory to be applicable to only small states. “For Rosenau’s inductive theory, then, small states, especially underdeveloped ones, were more

⁵ Rosenau: 148

⁶ Rosenau: 147-148

⁷ Rosenau: 150

⁸ Rosenau: 152

vulnerable to the vagaries of the international system and their own leaders than were their larger counterparts.”⁹ Even though Hey modified the context in which to utilize Rosenau’s theory, she does point to the multiple layer system as the best way to evaluate and understand the depth of the penetration being conducted by the nonmember actor.

Another advocate for the penetrated political system to be applicable only to small states is Wade Huntley. He applied the penetrated political system to the case of New Zealand during the Cold War after the country declared itself as a nuclear-free zone. For Huntley, the penetration came as “a form of influence of particular utility to small states.”¹⁰ A small state was able to penetrate the political debates of a larger state, namely the United States, despite its attempts to persuade and influence New Zealand to retract the nuclear-free policy. Huntley’s case presents the notion that small states are capable of reversing the effects of penetration onto the large states.

Michael Handal supports Huntley’s notion that the penetration process can be reversed, only its weak states, not only small states that can do this. The penetrated political system theory is an important tactic used by weak states in order to appeal to public opinion of stronger states.¹¹ However, this tactic is faulty because the state’s public opinion that is trying to be manipulated is stronger, as well as the fact that weak and strong states share common interests that could be in jeopardy.¹² This notion of penetrated political system is subjected to case by case situations and does not offer any

⁹ Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behaviors, Ed. Jeanne A.K. Hey, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2003: 185

¹⁰ Huntley, Wade, “The Kiwi That Roared: Nuclear-Free New Zealand in a Nuclear-Armed World”, *The Nonproliferation Review*, Fall 1996: 6

¹¹ Handal, Michael, Weak States in the International System, Frank Cass and Company Limited, London, 1981:124

¹² Handal: 158

substantial method in determining penetration and from interactions of states within the international system.

Although Hey, Huntley, and Handal make legitimate arguments for modifying Rosenau's theory to be applicable to small, weak states, all three maintain the notion the penetrated system theory can happen to any state, especially when the small state is using it as a tool against larger, powerful states. Also, all three authors agree with Rosenau that even the most minor of shifts in international relations, not domestic politics, is a sign that a state is penetrated. Another approach towards Rosenau's theory is introduced by L. Carl Brown, who suggests applying the theory in a more regional sense, in order to give a more narrow application. For Brown, the only region that qualifies to be called penetrated is the Middle East. He determines this from the stand point of two other indicators not given by Rosenau, but should be considered.

The first indicator is the number of nonmember actors and the nature of their involvement. Brown suggests that in order to be considered penetrated a state or region must be "caught up in multilateral great power politics."¹³ The multiple participants mean that the state's and region's political, social, and economic standing revolves around competing interests. Internal actors and organizations are being influenced in order to help perpetuate the competition as well as their own personal gain, and generally end up having very little interest in the direction of the state or region. Brown explains that the "penetrated political system is not simply a measure of the intensity of outside political or economic domination."¹⁴ It is rather a "continuous confrontation with a dominant outside

¹³ Brown, L. Carl, *International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984: 3

¹⁴ Brown: 4-5

political system”¹⁵, which blur the distinction amongst the local, national, regional, and international political needs.¹⁶

This leads Brown to his second indicator which is time. Since a system must be continuously at odds with greater powers, this means that a simple one time exchange on the international system, like the New Zealand against the nuclear armed United States, discussed by Huntley, would not be an example of a penetrated system, because of the short duration in which the incident occurred which changed the domestic and international politics within New Zealand. At the same time, a colonized country like India or any of the African countries would not be considered as penetrated because they achieved independence, thus putting an end to the direct connection to the one dominating force, despite the centuries of dominated control. Brown explains that parts of Africa and Asia could be considered as penetrated by other definitions, but these two regions, unlike the Middle East, were subjected to forms of imperialism or “absorbed” into a larger, more powerful entity.¹⁷ The Middle East, the only non-colonized region, is the only clear example of multiple actors involved because of seemingly diplomatic reasons are continuously involved so much so that even at the local level, there has to be “reference to the influence of the intrusive outside system.”¹⁸

Given the uniqueness of the Middle East, Brown is able to assume that a penetrated political system is one that was never absorbed or later achieved independence, but at the same time felt all the negative effects as a colonized state under the same duration of time. As a result, Brown came up with ways of explaining the complex

¹⁵ Brown: 5

¹⁶ Brown: 5

¹⁷ Brown: 5

¹⁸ Brown: 5

web of the Eastern Question, which he called The Rules of the Eastern Question Game.¹⁹ These rules highlight the fact that through shifting alliances, conflagrations of minor local issues and major international issues, and the evolution of bilateralism into multilateralism resulted in the “internationalized” or “penetrated” of the political system at all levels and the diplomatic relations between the Middle East and the rest of the international system.²⁰

Raymond Hinnebusch agrees with Leon Carl Brown that the Middle East is the only penetrated region, and expands upon Brown’s points. For Hinnebusch, it is the West that was the primary penetrating figure within the Middle East, most because of their superior technology, military, and especially their economic system. The West, both of the past and present, has an economic system based on the ideals of capitalism, which has continued to be the main avenue for which the West has been able to penetrate all layers of the political system.²¹ It has been through capitalism that the West has been able to maintain to penetrate the Middle East in regards to the more troubled topics of the region such as the exportation of oil, Israel-Palestinian relations, and the fragmentation of local rivalries.²² Hinnebusch recalls Brown’s point that multiple outside influences encourage and enhance these trouble spots without subordinating or absorbing the region, then the Middle East is still very much a penetrated regional political system.

Bearing in mind the original points developed by Rosenau and the applied points introduced by Brown and Hinnebusch, for the purposes of this paper, the penetrated political system is to be defined as multiple international state actors involved at state,

¹⁹ Brown: 16

²⁰ Brown: 16-17

²¹ Hinnebusch, Raymond, The International Politics of the Middle East, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2003: 14

²² Hinnebusch: 14

region, and international levels of government within a region that is neither subordinated nor absorbed into a greater state that becomes evident when examined and determined to have economic dependence, military weakness, a lack of social cohesion, and strategic vulnerability. Although Brown pointed out that those who have recently obtained independence from a colonizing, dominating force would be disqualified, in the case of Central Asia I would like to argue that this is not the case. Although Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan obtained independence in 1991, at the start of 1998, it became very obvious that these three countries were beginning to start turning away from Russia, their former colonizer, and began focusing their international relations towards other regional and international influences, and ever more so after September 11, 2001. It will be in the analysis portion of this paper to determine if this definition of the penetrated political system can be applied to Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan from 1998 through 2008.

Analysis

Economic Dependence

First, it is helpful to track the Gross Domestic Product growth within Central Asia from 1998 to 2008 in order to get an idea of where Central Asia stands on a global and regional level, as well as seeing how vulnerable their GDP is. Tracking the GDP in this manner will allow for the elimination of universal trends in GDP fluctuation on a international level, and at the same time see if there are commonalities with other

regional GDPs that may give a clue as to evaluate where direct penetration into Central Asia's economic system may be stemming from, if there is any.

Table 1




Table 1 shows where the GDPs growth for European Union and the Central Asia in total was in 1998. ExplorIt lumps the European Union and Central Asia together most like because of the shared history of dealings with the former Soviet Union, and also because most of the Central Asian countries are part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which is composed of nearly all the countries that gained their independence after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Table 2




Table 2 shows the GDPs are for the European Union and Central Asia in total was at when the terrorists attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. This is an important time marker because in many ways, for the Central Asian region as well as the international community, this was a turning point, a break from the status quo. One such break from the status quo is the introduction to the global war on terror, namely the United State's war in Afghanistan, and the introduction of the United States into the region, which will be discussed more in depth later on.

Table 3




Table 3 shows the GDP is for the European Union and Central Asia in total was at when the United States began its invasion of the Iraq. This is another important event to take note of because the invasion of Iraq, which despite the graph ending at 2006 is currently still taking place, had an impact upon the Central Asian region. Where the events of September 11 events saw the beginnings of the United States presence in the Central Asian region because of the War in Afghanistan, the War in Iraq, slightly diminished the United State's military presence. However, the War in Iraq had other more noticeable impact upon the Central Asian region, which will also be discussed further.

Tracking just the GDP of the European Union and Central Asia in total will only tell part of the story. Even though Central Asia does have some shared history and close ties with many European nations, especially the former Soviet territories and Russia, Central Asia has not had the same history of development and transition as their European counterparts did. So it is inaccurate to completely judge this steady upward incline of GDP as being equal representation for both the European Union and Central

Asia. So some comparisons of other regional GDPs that is closely affiliated with or border Central Asia might be able to give some better ideas about just the Central Asian region's GDP historical tracking.

Table 4






Table 4 is depicting the GDPs of the European Union and Central Asia in total in comparison to the rest of the world in 1998. Although the comparison is greatly inaccurate given the fact that the world is a far too board a category for the purposes of this paper, it is important nonetheless to illustrate the difference, even though at 1998, both GDPs were moving in a positive direction, the world being only a slight increase in GDP from year to year, and the other at a much greater increase from year to year.

Table 5




This is the same comparison as the last graph, only the timeline is indicating the events of September 11, 2001. What is interesting is that the around this time, the GDPs of the world in total and the GDPs of the European Union and Central Asia in total are nearly the same amount. In the case of these two tracks, the world GDP is starting to slightly decrease where as the European Union and Central Asia GDP is continuing to rapidly increase from year to year.

Table 6



However, during the United States' invasion of Iraq, 2002-2006, the differences between the world GDP in total and the European Union and Central Asia GDPs in total is very noticeable as the world GDP in total decreases and the European Union and Central GDPs continue to rapidly increase from year to year. What is interesting is the world's GDP could be declining in response to the heavy financial toll the War in Iraq played in the global economic system during the time given, but the European Union and Central Asia GDPs do not seem to be affected at all.

Table 7



This graph shows the total GDPs of the European Union and Central Asia, which is the trend line with dots; the total GDPs of East Asian countries, which is the trend line with Xs; the total GDPs of South Asian countries, which is the trend line with triangles; and the total GDPs of the Middle East, which is the trend line with +s. The timeline is set to highlight the United States' invasion of Iraq and the first four years of the war. Unlike the comparison between the European Union and Central Asia GDPs with the world's GDP these lines do not depict a clear universal direction of the regional GDPs, which does not correspond with world GDP from the graph above. East Asia's GDP is mirroring the European Union and Central Asia GDPs and rapidly increasing within the given time frame. South Asia GDP appears to be slightly declining; where as the Middle East GDP is slightly increasing. All four of these trend lines seem to vary greatly amongst each other, and even different from the world GDP trend line, which suggests that this specific time along with the invasion of Iraq did not have a universal global effect, which means that Central Asia's GDP is not similar to the world's GDP and therefore is still potentially vulnerable to economic domination by other state actors.

At the same time, these different trends also suggest that the Central Asian region may be vastly different than the European Union and Central Asian trend line suggests. All of the neighbors and neighboring regions of Central Asia are varying in degrees of trends with their GDPs in total. Perhaps specifically looking at the region separate from the European Union and other influences, as well as the GDP of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan will allow for a clearer portrait of the regional GDP trend, and how vulnerable it is to regional influences by determining the relationship between the GDP of these three countries and the amount of foreign investment that is going into these countries. If there is a relationship between the foreign investment and the GDP then there the suspicions of political penetration into the Central Asian region may be supported.

First, the GDPs of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan between 1998 and 2008 must be established. According to the ExplorIt program the ranking for the GDP per capita based on the purchasing power parity (PPP) in 2001, measure in international dollars, is as follows:

Rank	Case	Name	Value
4	12	KAZAKHSTAN	4951
2	25	UZBEKISTAN	2251
1	38	TAJIKISTAN	1140

These countries are ranked according to there standing within the total Asian region.

However, the ranking of for the same stats in 2005 is based on the global level.

Rank	Case	Name	Value
3	68	KAZAKHSTAN	5672
2	120	UZBEKISTAN	1604
1	137	TAJIKISTAN	943

Between 2001 and 2005 Kazakhstan's GDP PPP increased a far amount, whereas the Uzbekistan and Tajikistan decreased, the former a more substantially of a decrease than the latter. However, this does not match up completely with ExplorIt's data for the GDP per capita growth rate for 2005 as shown:

Rank	Case	Name	Value
5	17	TAJIKISTAN	4.5
1	143	UZBEKISTAN	0.5
1	147	KAZAKHSTAN	0.4

The average growth, according to this data is 2.357, which only Tajikistan overcame, despite the slight decrease in GDP PPP as shown above.

However, other sources help clear up the inconsistency of the data concerning the GDPs of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. According to Figure A.1, the GDP in 1998 for Kazakhstan was \$75 billion, Tajikistan was \$5 billion, and Uzbekistan \$79 billion. The GDP per capita for Kazakhstan was 4,809, Tajikistan was 830, and Uzbekistan was 3,296 as measured in international dollars²³. Keeping these statistics in mind, Figure A.2 tracks the real growth of the GDP, especially from 1998 to 2005, which gives a better idea as to how the GDP stats from 1998 have been progressing for each country until 2005²⁴. And according to Figure A.3, the average growth rate of the GDP per capita from 1990 to 2005 for Kazakhstan is 2%, Tajikistan is -4%, and Uzbekistan is 0.3%. Also, the GDP PPP as of 2005 for Kazakhstan decreased to \$57.1 billion and the GDP per capita increased 7857; Tajikistan decreased to \$2.3 billion and the GDP per

²³ Pomfret, Richard, "Central Asia Since the Dissolution of the Soviet Union: Economic Reforms and Their Impact on State-Society Relations," 2006. The Greater Middle East in Global Politics: Social Science Perspectives on the Changing Geography of the World Politics, Ed. Mehdi Parvizi Amineh., International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology, Brill, Leiden, Vol 106, 2007: 305

²⁴ Pomfret: 306

capita rose to 1356; and Uzbekistan also decreased to \$14 billion and the GDP per capita fell to 2063.²⁵

However, in 2006, 2007, and 2008 in Kazakhstan the GDP PPP increased to \$158.3 billion to \$171.1 billion to \$176.9 billion (respectively), which also increased the GDP per capita (measured in international dollars) from 10,400 in 2006, 11,200 in 2007, and 11,500 in 2008.²⁶ Kazakhstan's GDP growth rate was 10.6% in 2006, 8.5% in 2007, and 3% in 2008,²⁷ which given the GDPs for those years, makes sense why the growth would not be that high. Tajikistan in 2006 the GDP PPP was \$11.32 billion, with a GDP per capita at 1600, and a growth rate of 7%; in 2007 the GDP PPP grew to \$14.27 billion, a GDP per capita of 1700, and a growth rate of 7.8%; and in 2008 a GDP PPP increase to \$15.4 billion, a GDP per capita reaching 2100 and a growth rate as high as 7.9%.²⁸ Uzbekistan in 2006 had a GDP PPP of \$60.07 billion, a GDP per capita of 2,200, and a growth rate of 7.3%; 2007 saw increases in the GDP PPP of \$65.77 billion, GDP per capita of 2,400 and a growth rate of 9.5%, and in 2008 there an increase in the GDP PPP of \$71.63 billion and in the GDP per capita of 2,600, but a decrease in growth rate to 8.9%.²⁹

By going a bit more in depth than the ExplorIt program allowed of the GDP trend for Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan from 1998 to 2008, it becomes quite clear that

²⁵ United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2007 Data (build your own table) Financial and GDP Data: http://hdrstats.undp.org/buildtables/rc_report.cfm#

²⁶ The CIA World Factbook: Kazakhstan
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kz.html>

²⁷ The CIA World Factbook: Kazakhstan
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kz.html>

²⁸ The CIA World Factbook: Tajikistan
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ti.html>

²⁹ The CIA World Factbook: Uzbekistan
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uz.html>

there are fluctuations and inconsistencies which nonetheless show an overall increasing tendency for all three countries. However, in referring back to the historical tracking, this in depth look does certainly refute the possibility that the European Union and Central Asia had that similar of GDPs and that rapid of growth thereof. At the same time, the in depth look also reaffirmed the notion that regional and not historical state actors have a better opportunity to make their Central Asia neighbors economically dependent upon them because of the similar natures of the economic systems based on the GDPs.

In addition to tracking the GDP, tracking the foreign direct investment is another way to determine if there is the presence of economic dependency on the part of Central Asia on another regional member or global power. Figure A.3 shows that in 2005, 3.5% of the GDP in Kazakhstan, 2.4% of the GDP in Tajikistan, and 0.3% of the GDP in Uzbekistan came from direct foreign investment.³⁰ However, when this figure is combined with development assistance and government sponsored private investment, the seemingly small amount now starts becoming much bigger. As Figure A.3 also shows that although only 0.4% of the GDP in Kazakhstan is from development assistance totals, 11.9% of the GDP is made up from private investment all in 2005. That is a total of at least 15.8% of the total GDP of Kazakhstan in 2005 came from foreign sources that did not result in trade. Tajikistan has -0.1% of the GDP composed of private investment, but 10.4% of the GDP composed development assistance, which means that only 12.7% of Tajikistan's GDP is made up of foreign money, but given how Tajikistan's GDP is the smallest of the three, that 12.7% comes out to be a bigger amount in the long run. Uzbekistan on the other hand has -1.7% in private investment and a low amount of

³⁰ Human Development Report 2007 Data, Financial and GDP Data

development assistance, which is 1.2%, which means that Uzbekistan's GDP has the least amount of foreign components at -0.2%.

These figures tracking the percentage of GDP direct foreign investment makes up is similar to that given by ExplorIt, which only covers up to 2005, but is still on track despite the inconsistency with the other figures given when tracking the GDP.

Rank	Case	Name	Value
5	15	KAZAKHSTAN	12.3
2	80	TAJIKISTAN	2.9
	--	UZBEKISTAN	

However, Figure A.3 does not show where direct foreign investment, the development assistance and the private investment is coming from or to what it is dictated to. Figure A.4 shows three nongovernmental agencies, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank, that are sending in funds to Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, to be spent on economic and political development.³¹ USAID is the United States Agency for International Development, which is a state sponsored development agency, which is according to this Figure a large, long-term contributor of funds to these countries. Figure A.5 gives the long-term scope as to how much USAID has been giving annually to these three countries, which for the most part has been very inconsistent from year to year such as the case of Uzbekistan who received \$26.0 million in 2001, which shot up to \$124.9 million in 2002, but in 2003 that number dropped to \$39.4 million from USAID.³² Even Kazakhstan's aid amounts jump around, albeit not as drastic as Uzbekistan, but still not conducive to maintaining long-term development projects.

³¹ Olcott, Martha Brill, *Central Asia's Second Chance*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., 2nd edition, 2007: 253

³² Olcott: 255

These inconsistencies do not lend themselves to stable development projects, especially those that are outlined by USAID as to where the aid that is being given must go towards, as shown in Figure A.6. USAID has given money for project to promote economic and political reform as well as developing private-sector initiatives.³³ However, Figure A.6 also addresses the importance of when talking about development assistance or foreign investment by the United States in Central Asia to note the difference between pre-September 11 and post-September 11. The United States' movement into the region, both literally and geopolitically speaking, meant a greater need for goodwill towards these five Central Asian states, which for the United States has traditionally been, and this being no exception given in the form of large amounts of aid. However, the aid would come directly from the United States government's allocations instead of through USAID, as Figures A.7, A.8, and A.9 show. "Direct U.S. assistance outlays to the area more than doubled in the first year [2001]; by 2005 nonmilitary aid to the five countries had swollen to \$2.67 billion, and the United States also supported vastly expanded inputs from international financial institutions."³⁴ As Figure A.7 show, by 2005 Uzbekistan was receiving the largest amount of aid from the United States, and had consistently in post-September 11 era,³⁵ which is only exaggerated by visual aids of Figures A.8³⁶ and A.9.³⁷ Kazakhstan and to a lesser extent Tajikistan also demonstrate this trend. And even with fighting two wars, the United States is still able to maintain a sizable amount of aid to

³³ Olcott: 263

³⁴ Simons Jr., Thomas W. "The United States, Asian Security, and Central Asia before and after September 11", *Islam, Oil, and Geopolitics: Central Asia after September 11*, Ed Elizabeth Van Wie Davis and Rouben Azizian, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., Lanham, 2007: 277

³⁵ Olcott: 254

³⁶ Olcott: 255

³⁷ Olcott: 256

give annually to these five countries says something about the overwhelming amount of economic power of the United States.

However, unlike the United States, other state actors prefer direct government spending through trade or through investments within the private sectors, which given natural resources, namely the energy resources found in Central Asia, these kinds of investments are sure to see long-term payoffs. Even if through regular trade, outside countries can still be very profitable, however trade generally has a mutually beneficial aspect to it that does not allow economic dependency to occur, unless there the there is an exclusive partnership who is setting the standard to an unfair advantage. However, as Figure A.10 shows, that the steady increase or nearly consistent increase in profits from exports and expenditures for imports, that a solo trading partner can not be the case.³⁸

So if there was economic dependency, it would be found within the private investments, or the government made investments in the private sector. For the purpose of this paper, this part of the analysis will focus primarily on the dealings pertaining to the oil and natural gas reserves within Central Asia that require the participation of outside state actors or companies acting on behalf of a state actor. Figures A. 11, A. 12, and A. 13, give snap shot images of major joint projects pertaining to field exploration and pipeline building, as well as infrastructure endeavors. With Figure A. 11, it is clear that when dealing with Kazakhstan and its oil, there is never a shortage of countries, or companies acting on behalf of a country that are willing to participate. In the Kashagan offshore oil field alone there are six outside companies (ENI from Italy, ExxonMobil from the United States, Royal Dutch/Shell from the UK-Netherlands, TotalFinaElf from France, ConocoPhillips from the United States, and Inpex from Japan) and two Kazakh

³⁸ Pomfret: 325

companies (KCO and KazMunayGaz).³⁹ Meanwhile Figure A.12, with reference to Tajikistan, shows that development of hydropower stations, which is a big part of infrastructure for any country, is what is most important for Tajikistan.⁴⁰ And Figure A.13 with reference to Uzbekistan shows that there is diversification in development of its natural resources primarily for the purpose of making them available for the regional or global market.⁴¹

In order to fully appreciate the importance of the involvement of outside state actors and their companies into the region for the purposes of developing the natural resources so that they can be sold and used by regional and global partners, there must be an establishment of how much oil and natural gas reserves each country has. According to Figure A.14, in 2006 Kazakhstan's proven oil reserves were at 39.6 billion bbl (barrels per day), and its proven natural gas reserves were at 105.9 trillion cubic feet (tcf). However, this Figure only emphasizes the Caspian region, which for this table does not include Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. A more thorough approach has been done by Figures A.15, A.16, and A. 17, which examines each of the three countries one by one. According to Figure A.15, as of 2007 Kazakhstan's proven oil reserve was estimated at 30 billion barrels, and the natural gas reserve was estimated at 100,000 billion cubic feet.⁴² In Figure A.16 it is estimated that proven oil reserve in Tajikistan was in 2007 at 0.012 billion barrels, and the natural gas reserves was in 2007 200 billion cubic feet.⁴³ Uzbekistan's estimated proven oil reserve in 2007 was at 0.594 billion barrels, and

³⁹ Olcott: 265

⁴⁰ Olcott: 266

⁴¹ Olcott: 267

⁴² Kazakhstan Energy Profile, Energy Information Administration: Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government, 2007: http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_time_series.cfm?fips=KZ

⁴³ Tajikistan Energy Profile, Energy Information Administration: Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government, 2007: http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_time_series.cfm?fips=TI

estimated proven natural gas reserves in 2007 was at 65,000 billion cubic feet, all according to Figure A.17.⁴⁴ The most recent estimates show that Kazakhstan's proven oil reserve is unchanged, but the natural gas reserve has increased to 2.832 tcf as of 2008; Tajikistan's proven oil reserves are unchanged as well, but the natural gas reserves decreased to 5.663 billion cubic feet as of 2008; and Uzbekistan's proven oil reserve is unchanged, but the natural gas reserves increased to 1.841 tcf as of 2008.⁴⁵ To put it in another way, the proven oil reserves and proven natural gas reserves totaled in the region place Central Asia second or third region within the world for highest amounts, with the Middle East still being the top producer.

With all of the proven reserves established, the next step is to determine how the oil and natural gas are retrieved from under the ground and into the refineries so that it all becomes useful, profitable merchandise. This paper will not go into the mechanics of drilling process, but will have to look at who is involved with the exploration, the drilling, the transportation, and the refining and selling of the oil and natural gas from Central Asia. At the same time there are other countries that are directly investing in the infrastructure of these countries in order to help directly or indirectly maximize the amount of oil and natural gas to be used for the market instead of individual use. However, in order to fully understand the roles that Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan as well as the other state actors play within this part of the Analysis, it would be best to switch from the quantitative approach and look more at these matters in a case study format. There are several countries that have invested in the oil and natural gas

⁴⁴ Uzbekistan Energy Profile, Energy Information Administration: Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government, 2007: http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_time_series.cfm?fips=UZ

⁴⁵ CIA World Factbook

production of these three Central Asian countries, so it would be important to summarize the involvement of each country within Central Asia.

Russia

The first country to look at will be the former colonizer, and now regional power, Russia. It is no surprise that within the years following the fall of the Soviet Union and the independence of the Central Asian states that Russia would still be intertwined with economics of these countries. This would be a direct result of the fact that these countries were “absorbed”⁴⁶ into the Soviet Union, and the economic ties and dependency did not die with independence. However, by the late 1990s and into the 21st century, the Central Asian states had effectively converted their markets to be competitive within the global system, and other countries started introducing alternatives to Russia. However, when it concerns the energy sector Russia is still as apart of Central Asia’s economy as every.

“Having lost the “Battle of the Caspian” in the 1990s to Western oil companies, Russia now seeks to increase its own companies’ share of Kazakhstan’s oil production and to channel the maximum amount possible through pipelines that traverse Russian territory.”⁴⁷ The Caspian region, which used to be under Soviet control, is one of the newest and biggest oil hot spots in Central Asia, and Kazakhstan is one of the biggest components of it, which means that ever since independence, Kazakhstan has been using the remaining Soviet structures in order to keep the oil moving out into the world market. Russia, through its state pipeline operator Transneft was the main negotiator in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, of which the United States was involved in as a way to

⁴⁶ Brown: 5

⁴⁷ Trenin, Dmitri, “Russia and Central Asia: Interests, Policies, and Prospects”, Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, Ed Eugene Rumer, Dmitri Trenin, Huasheng Zhao, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 2007: 106

ensure that Kazakh oil from Tengiz once at the Russian port of Novorossiisk would reach world markets.⁴⁸ This Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) has been active ever since. “In 2001, most of Kazakh oil exports were shipped mainly via the Atyrau-Samara pipeline through Russia, with additional supplies being shipped by rail and by barge across the Caspian Sea.”⁴⁹ In 2005, Russia finished construction on the Baku-Tbilisis-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, in which Russia has encouraged Kazakhstan to start sending its small amount of oil that it does send via the Caspian Sea, through this pipeline as a way to show international cooperation because the oil deposits in Turkey instead of Russia.⁵⁰ Russia’s ties to the Caspian Sea region has ensured that it maintains a presence within Kazakhstan and has direct control to the Kazakh oil that flows out of the region and that goes into the world markets.

As recent as 2007, LUKoil, a Russian based oil company, had a 15% share in Karachaganak oilfield, which is found along the western Kazakh-Russian border and apart of the Caspian region, a 50% share in the Kumkol oilfield which is located in the heart of Kazakhstan, and has a joint venture within the Dostyk oilfield.⁵¹ Then there is the Russian state-owned Rosneft and Zarubenhneft oil company which has a 50% production-sharing agreement with Kazakhstan’s oil company KazMunaiGaz as of 2005 in the Kurmangazy oilfield.⁵² Despite all of the Russian oil companies’ involvement in

⁴⁸ Olcott: 58 and Cutler, Robert M., “US – Russian Strategic Relations and the Structuration of Central Asia”, The Greater Middle East in Global Politics: Social Science Perspective on the Changing Geography of the World Politics, Ed. M Parvizi Amineh, International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology, Brill, Leiden, Vol. 106, 2007: 103

⁴⁹ Amineh, Mehdi Parvizi and Henk Houweling, “Caspian Energy: Oil and Gas Resources and the Global Market”, Central Eurasia in Global Politics: Conflict, Security, and Development, Ed. Mehdi Parvizi Amineh and Henk Houweling, International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology, Brill, Leiden, Vol. 92, 2004: 89

⁵⁰ Pomfret: 313

⁵¹ Trenin: 106-107

⁵² Trenin: 106

Kazakh oil fields, the Russians have continued to place high tariffs for Kazakh oil companies, which are twice as high as those for their Russian counterparts, which cause Kazakhstan to look to other means in which to transport their oil to the world market.⁵³ At the same time Russian companies have also moved into Kazakhstan's budding natural gas production in order to give Kazakhstan some reassurances. Gazprom, a has a 50-50 joint venture with KazMunaiGaz with Kazakhstan's natural gas market, which as of 2004 is only 16 billion cubic meters (bcm) yearly, but with both companies help, it should reach 70 bcm by 2010.⁵⁴ KazRosGaz, another Russian company has been purchasing Kazakh gas from Karachaganak and Tengiz, from the Caspian region, and selling the natural gas to Western European countries.⁵⁵ For the most part, Russia is still trying to work out a long-term agreement that would allow Kazakh natural gas to find its way to Russia's refinery system in Orenburg.⁵⁶

Gazprom is also involved in the natural gas market found within Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan looks to Gazprom to not only develop the natural gas fields but also for transporting the gas into the world market.⁵⁷ Gazprom has production-sharing agreements on the Urga, Kuanysh, and Akchalak gas fields, and is ready to invest 1.5 billion in order to expand its purchase of Uzbek gas from 5-6 bcm to 9 billion bcm in 2006 and 17-18 billion bcm by 2010.⁵⁸ As of 2007, Uzbekistan was producing 54 bcm yearly. Uzbekistan has also looked to Zarubezhneftegaz, a subsidiary of Gazprom, and LUKoil to help

⁵³ Trenin: 107

⁵⁴ Trenin: 108

⁵⁵ Trenin: 109

⁵⁶ Olcott: 193

⁵⁷ Olcott: 194

⁵⁸ Trenin: 108

expand its budding oil sector, which could mean a \$2 billion investment into Uzbekistan's entire energy sector.⁵⁹

Unlike Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Tajikistan has very little oil or natural gas reserves, and unfortunately those reserves are located within the undeveloped mountain region, which makes it too complicated for companies to utilize these fields. However, thanks to its mountainous terrain, Tajikistan can boast a good number of rivers and lakes that can be harnessed for hydroelectricity. The United Energy Systems (RAO UES), Russia's electricity monopoly, has seen this potential in Tajikistan, and have committed to \$250 million towards building the Sangtuda hydroelectric plant in Tajikistan.⁶⁰ In addition, Russia's leading aluminum producer Russian Aluminum, RusAl, has plans for a long-term investment in the Rugun hydroelectric complex in order to construct a large aluminum smelter.⁶¹ "RusAl's investment commitments reach 3.1 billion dollars."⁶²

China

China is already established itself a regional power within the Asian continent, and is a rising global superpower. However, with all of this power, comes increasing energy needs as well as the need to ensure good relations with their neighbors. When it comes to Central Asia, China is able to take care of both at the same time. At the same time, China is able to provide a very desirable alternative to the unchanged Russian model with development and transportation of Central Asian oil and natural gas out of the region and into the world markets.

⁵⁹ Olcott: 194

⁶⁰ Olcott: 195

⁶¹ Olcott: 195

⁶² Trenin: 109

Thanks to a tender of 60% stake and control of Kazakh Aktiubinsk Oil and Gas to develop the Zhanazhol and Kenkiyah oilfields won by Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) in 1997, by 1998 China was already on its way to staking a claim of the energy sector of Central Asia, via Kazakhstan.⁶³ CNPC in 2003, thanks to the Committee on State Assets and Privatization of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan, was able to obtain 85.42% of the stock in Aktobe Muaigaz, which increased the output to 4.56 million tons.⁶⁴ In 2005, CNPC invested 4.18 billion to purchase PetroKazakhstan, a company that is registered in Canada but operates exclusively in Kazakhstan, which proved the purchase before the year's end. At the same time CNPC signed a memorandum with Kazakhstan National Oil and Gas Company stating that the Kazakhstan National Oil and Gas Company would have part stock in PetroKazakhstan in order "to preserve national strategic control of mineral resource development and the right to manage a refinery jointly under PetroKazakhstan, as well as to share finished oil products on equal terms."⁶⁵ Meanwhile, PetroChina Company Limited purchased 35% stock from Saudi Arabia's Nimir Petroleum and 65% from Chevron Texaco, resulting in nearly full ownership of the North Buzachi oilfield of western Kazakhstan in 2003, which in 2002 was producing 320,000 tons. PetroChina had planned to increase the output to one million in the next couple of years.⁶⁶

At the same time, PetroChina has been working with CNPC on a 2,900 – 3,000 kilometer pipeline project that would link Atyrau, Kazakhstan with the Kenkiyah oilfield,

⁶³ Olcott: 199 and Zhao, Huasheng, "Central Asia in China's Diplomacy", Central Asia: Vies from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, ed. Eugene Rumer, Dmitri Trenin, and Huasheng Zhao, ME Sharpe, Armonk, 2007: 166

⁶⁴ Zhao: 166

⁶⁵ Zhao: 166

⁶⁶ Zhao: 166

which would eventually cross into China, and has been estimated to cost \$3 to \$3.5 billion.⁶⁷ Due to difficulties, mostly stemming from funding, because in order for the project to see returns there had to be at least 20 million tons of oil annually pumped out and Kazakhstan at the time of planning was only at 25.9 million tons of oil which would not allow Kazakhstan to fulfill all of its oil needs,⁶⁸ as well as the massive size of the pipeline that it has been split up into three stages. The first stage runs from Atyrau to the Kenkiyah oilfield, which completed construction in 2002 and was fully operational by early 2004.⁶⁹ “Its initial annual capacity was 6 million tons, but will eventually increase to 15 million tons.”⁷⁰ The second stage will connect Atasu, Kazakhstan, which is in the heart of the country to the Xinjiang province of western China, which will be about 1,240 kilometers⁷¹ and cost \$850 million.⁷² In 2004, CNPC and KazMunaiGaz agreed to allow the pipeline to begin construction so long as each company got 50% of the profits through a joint company called Sino-Kazakh Pipeline. Construction started in late 2004 and this part of the pipeline was in operation a year later, with an output capacity of 10 million tons of oil annually.⁷³ The final stage is to connect the two pipelines, which is from the Kenkiyah oilfield to Atasu, which is 1,340 kilometers, and is expected to be operational by 2011.⁷⁴ This giant pipeline, once completed, will give Kazakhstan an alternative way of having Kazakh oil reach the world markets and will give China access to the Caspian region, despite being “unable to secure a share in Kazakhstan’s giant

⁶⁷ Olcott: 199 and Zhao: 167

⁶⁸ Zhao: 167

⁶⁹ Olcott: 199

⁷⁰ Zhao: 167

⁷¹ Olcott: 199

⁷² Zhao: 167

⁷³ Zhao: 168

⁷⁴ Zhao: 168

Kashagan oil field for its two principal oil companies”⁷⁵, which is one of the main oil fields by the Caspian Sea.

In addition to acquiring access to oilfields in Kazakhstan, China has also directly invested in Kazakhstan, which is noticeable by the fact that out of the \$8.7 billion China invests in Central Asia back in 2005; \$7 billion of it goes to Kazakhstan.⁷⁶ Around 2005, Chinese direct investment by the state exceeded \$1.4 billion, which went to primarily “to the oil sector, food processing, leather-making factories, catering, and treat.”⁷⁷ China and Kazakhstan are directly involved in so many joint projects both within the energy sector and without that direct investment estimates on the side of China in Kazakhstan can exceed \$10 billion before the end of the decade.⁷⁸ Kazakhstan also has a chance of receiving a \$900 million loan from China just for being apart of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)⁷⁹, a group that was started up back 1997-1998 to promote regional security and economic development, and that will discussed in depth later on.

China’s other interest within the region, Uzbekistan, is also based on developing and trading the limited amounts of oil and natural gas that Uzbekistan possesses. China would like to use investments in Uzbek oil and gas a means for the beginnings of strong, long-term bilateral relations, which would be beneficial to Uzbekistan because it would give it a competitive edge with Kazakhstan in the region.⁸⁰ However, the first problem for China’s involvement in the energy sector is transportation, because the two countries do

⁷⁵ Olcott: 199

⁷⁶ Zhao: 171

⁷⁷ Zhao: 171

⁷⁸ Zhao: 173

⁷⁹ Zhao: 170

⁸⁰ Zhao: 175

not share a border, and the terrain between them does not lend itself to pipelines. As a result, China must invest in building railways and highways between itself and Uzbekistan in order to transport out the oil and natural gas. Prior to 2003, all traded cargo between China and Uzbekistan went the ways through Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan controlled lines, which added to the cost of the materials, and not making it conducive for furthering trade between the two countries.⁸¹ In 1998, Uzbekistan, China, and Kyrgyzstan signed an automobile transportation agreement that stated that all countries involved will pledge to complete upgrades on Karakaroum highway by October 1998, so that way there will be more freight storage facilities along the route.⁸² Building roadways is also China's only main concern when it comes to Tajikistan. In late 1998, Tajikistan opened up the Qurgan-Teppe-Kulob railway which can link up to the Karakaroum highway.⁸³ Then, in late 2003, China opened the first highway, the Karasu Pass that spans across the Tajik-China border and opens up Tajikistan for more trading and an alternate route for Uzbek oil and natural gas to reach China.⁸⁴ The downside to all of using rail and roads is the fact that in the mountainous terrain that spans across most of the Central Asian region and along the Chinese border closers because of weather related events, like snow or natural disasters, like rock slides, are commonplace, and makes current and future transportation of goods slow going.⁸⁵

⁸¹ Zhao: 177

⁸² Olcott: 65-66

⁸³ Olcott: 66

⁸⁴ Zhao: 178

⁸⁵ Olcott: 66

Japan

As an emerging economic center in the global sense as well as in the regional sense, and given the growing energy needs, it is no surprise that Japan has turned its sights on to the Central Asian region. Japan's approach to the region is to encourage development, so that stability is preserved in the region and good relations amongst the countries with Japan is promoted. This is evident with Japan's persuading Central Asia into joining the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in order to for the Central Asian states to receive official development assistance (ODA).⁸⁶ "As of 2000, Japan is the biggest ODA donor to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan."⁸⁷ However, Japan does not assign any special priority on oil and natural gas producing countries over their counterparts in the region, because Japan has adopted the foreign policy that approaches Central Asia as a region instead of a state by state approach in hopes that this will continue to promote stability in the region.⁸⁸ Even though Japan sent energy missions to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, composed of government officials, representatives of the private sector and academics, in 2002,⁸⁹ Japan does not leave out Tajikistan as a possible future trading partner. However, Japan realizes that due to its limited resources, it can only continue being a big donor of ODAs to the region and give governmental economic and technical assistance to Central Asia.⁹⁰

However, Japan's private sector has a bit more leeway in direct involvement in the development and transporting in Central Asia's energy sector. Although, Japan is

⁸⁶ Shimizu, Manabu, "Central Asia's Energy Resources: Japan's Energy Interests", Islam, Oil, and Geopolitics: Central Asia after September 11, Ed. Elizabeth Van Wie Davis and Rouben Azizian, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2007: 111

⁸⁷ Shimizu: 111

⁸⁸ Shimizu: 111-112

⁸⁹ Shimizu: 114

⁹⁰ Shimizu: 112

hindered in directly receiving oil and natural gas imports because of geographical distance and no viable and economically sound method of transporting the oil and gas to the island nation, Japan's companies are able to contribute in ways of funding projects and receiving shares of the profits from said projects. Two Japanese companies, ITOCHU Oil Exploration and IPEX are involved in funding the third stage of the Chinese pipeline project, because Japan believes that "any huge pipeline projects that connect Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan with China need Japan's financial participation."⁹¹ At the same time, Japan's private sector is also expanding into non-oil and non-gas producing states, like Tajikistan, in hopes of increasing overall influence in the area as well as developing regional cooperation in various fields, thereby promoting regional development and stability.⁹²

Turkey

Ever since independence, Turkey has been reconnecting with its lost Turkic people of Central Asia, and utilize this cultural tie to build up economic relations. With its strong economy and close relations with the United States, Turkey feels that it provides a good alternative to the dominating forces of the regional powers, Russia and China, and other Middle Eastern states which would promote extreme Islamism in the region. "A major Turkish asset has been its vibrant private sector as well as its nongovernmental organizations, including Islamic organizations. These industrial concerns and NGOs have expanded Turkey's presence, while contributing to the physical

⁹¹ Shimizu: 117

⁹² Shimizu: 119

and intellectual development of Central Asia.”⁹³ With the finished construction of the BTC pipeline, the connections between the Turkish private sector and Kazakh oil and natural gas companies have been intertwined on this joint project, which Turkey hopes will be only the first among many with Kazakhstan and the rest of the Turkic republics, which includes Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

However, Turkey’s involvement is viewed with a cautious eye from the Russians, for historical reasons as well as current situations. Russia has long been an opponent to Turkey, ever since the days of the Ottoman Empire. Russia is leery of Turkey attempting to reclaim its former glory by staring in Central Asia, an area that was never under Ottoman control. “Russian policy makers did not want to see Central Asians trade Moscow for Ankara [Turkey’s capital] (or worse yet, for a partnership with Ankara and Washington) and put considerable pressure on the region’s leaders to keep a balanced policy toward Turkey – a policy in which relationships with Anakara were not at the exclusion of older and ore traditional friendships.”⁹⁴ At the same time, Central Asian leaders are leery of Turkey as well because they see Turkey itself as trying to replace Russia as a dominate economic example and partner because nearly all of the Central Asian state adopted the Turkish model of free enterprise.⁹⁵ As a result of the leeriness on behalf of Russia and the Central Asian leaders, Turkey’s economic influence has not been allowed to become too involved despite help from the United States.

⁹³ Hunter, Shireen, “Iran, Turkey, and Central Asia: The Islamic Connection”, Islam, Oil, and Geopolitics: Central Asia after September 11, Ed. Van Wie Davis, Elizabeth and Rouben Azizian, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2007: 191

⁹⁴ Olcott: 74

⁹⁵ Olcott: 74

Iran

Although Iran has only cultural connections with Tajikistan, it does share commonalities with all of the other Central Asian states, which include a religious connection, a common threat emanating from the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, and more importantly, Iran is also an oil producing state within the region with available ports and some economic sway within the region. Iran, geographically speaking is the shortest route to port cities and oil tankers, which is the easiest and most profitable way to transport oil, should have first pick of contracts and pipelines for Central Asia. Unfortunately, due to the United States' embargo on Iran, many countries are wary of souring relations with the United States by directly trading and making economic partnership with Iran. As a result, Iran with its geographical prime position for Central Asian oil transportation, is unable to partake in large joint ventures.

For now Iran has access to a limited amount of Kazakh oil exports through swap agreements.⁹⁶ These swap agreements have boosted Iran-Kazakh trade to \$370 million in 2004, and trade with Uzbekistan is only \$150 million in 2002 despite geographic closeness and the promise of future swap agreement because Uzbekistan's growing oil production.⁹⁷ And trade with Tajikistan is only at \$37 million as of 2005, despite the \$360 million investment Iran made into the Sangtoodeh hydroplant.⁹⁸ Although Central Asia is trading with Iran on a small level, Central Asia cannot look to Iran for much more than trade. Aside from the United States' embargo, "economically Iran is not in a position to initiate structural modernization in Central Asia and the Caucasus despite having hard

⁹⁶ Hunter: 194

⁹⁷ Hunter: 194

⁹⁸ Hunter: 194 - 195

currency from petrol dollars.”⁹⁹ For the time being, Iran can only continue building economic influences and relations through more investment into Tajikistan, whom it has a cultural connection with and is the only one and through swap agreements with the other Central Asian states.

India and Pakistan

Both India and Pakistan are budding regional powers with nuclear weapons and strategic importance. Also, India, like China, has a booming economy that is allowing India to become regionally and globally competitive. Pakistan is looking for ways to launch its fledging economy in hopes that it will bring stability within the country and be competitive with its rival, India. As a result, both countries have growing energy needs, and with economies that need a boost, and look to Central Asia to satisfy those needs. India sees itself as a viable alternative to having Central Asian oil reach the global markets, given the vast coastline with multiple port cities and its good relations with Russia and the United States.¹⁰⁰ However, the volatility of Afghanistan and Pakistan hinder the ability to build a pipeline that would make it to India.¹⁰¹ Pakistan also sees itself as a possible alternative for oil transportation because it too has multiple ports. Pakistan “had vain hope that the revitalized Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) could serve as an effective instrument for creating multilateral projects encouraging economic ties,” such as pipelines.¹⁰² However, because of the presence of the Taliban and the fact that pipeline would still have to pass through the highly unstable Afghanistan,

⁹⁹ Lounev, Sergey, “Russian-Indian Relations in Central Asia”, Islam, Oil, and Geopolitics: Central Asia after September 11, Ed. Van Wie Davis, Elizabeth and Rouben Azizian, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2007: 177

¹⁰⁰ Lounev: 178

¹⁰¹ Lounev: 178

¹⁰² Olcott: 76

has prevented such pipeline.¹⁰³ Despite being cut off from direct economic connections with Central Asia, India and Pakistan utilize other indirect means, such as military assistance (which will be discussed in depth later on) to create stability within the region in order to promote future economic partnerships.

These case studies illustrate not only how many countries are economically involved with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, but also to the extent of which each country is involved and why. Russia and China are the most directly involved with the development of the energy sector of Kazakhstan and to some lesser extent in Uzbekistan. Some of the deals were done in conjunction with native companies; others were done on behalf of the host country by Russia or China, in order to maximize the amount of production and profit for themselves. It is no surprise that Russia would still have the mentality of a colonizer when dealing with these countries, but it is less expected from China given that it is a recent power within the region and newly influential within the Central Asian republics. However, China's newfound economic power has allowed China to exercise its strength and sway, especially when concerning the Sino-Kazakh Pipeline. Because of China's exercise of power, other countries, like Japan, also a regional economic power, became involved with the stability and economic development of Central Asia, which is all at once insuring that the problems of mainland Asia do not spill over into Japan, but also helping counteract China's economic influence.

In addition to Russia and China, the United States is also a major economic player, if only behind the scenes, which is why it did not have its own case study. This can be seen in the case of Turkey and Iran. The United States has military and economic

¹⁰³ Olcott: 77

ties with Turkey a reason why Turkey's free market economy is thriving. It is because of these connections that have caused Russia to be cautious of present-day Turkey being involved in Central Asia, and thus Russia has attempted to block Turkey's involvement. At the same time the United States has an embargo on Iran. This means that countries have to choose between trading and creating economic partnerships with Iran or risk losing the United States' economic support. Since Central Asia receives so much aid from the United States, and the United States can offer other types of aid, Central Asia is given little choice but to acknowledge the embargo on Iran, to a certain extent.

The last two, India and Pakistan, are not as influential as all the other countries, but are working towards making a direct economic partnership and access to Central Asia's energy sector a reality. Through military support, which will be discussed in the next chapter, the problems within Afghanistan and Pakistan are being combated on all sides. Although India and Pakistan are cut off from the rest of Central Asia, their goals are exactly the same as every other state actor: the preservation and promotion of stability and peace. The methods however differ, which can be seen a little through the economic endeavors.

Through case studies and the tracking of the GDPs of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, it becomes rather simple to answer the question as to whether or not these three countries are economically dependent on outside countries. Although Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have made the full transition from communism to free markets, they are in need of outside support, or foreign direct investment, to develop and transport out their most profitable export, oil and natural gas. Their own companies are

not equipped and lack the funding in which to make oil and natural gas exporting a viable option. At the same time, in the case of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, parts of their infrastructure require outside assistance, instead utilizing their own companies and man power. In addition, the large sums of aid and developmental assistance these countries receive rival those other developing countries. The ExplorIt program lists these countries as Industrial, as shown below.

ECON DEVEL - LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (HDR, 1998)

Rank	Case	Name	Category
5	1	KAZAKHSTAN	INDUSTRIAL
5	1	TAJIKISTAN	INDUSTRIAL
5	1	UZBEKISTAN	INDUSTRIAL

However, the ExplorIt program does not show to what extent these countries have to rely upon foreign investment and foreign aid in order to build up their industry, especially within the energy sector, and maintain their economic standing. And it is because of this reliance that it is clear that Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are economically dependent on outside state actors. The economic dependence and the sheer number of outside state actors who are directly involved at all levels government (i.e. working with state run facilities and building infrastructure is national; building pipelines and joining regional economic development groups is regional; and the political and economic pressure of forging alliances is international) means that the penetrated political system theory at this point can apply.

Military Weakness

Since independence, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan were for the first time were in command of their own internal and external security and defense needs.

WAR -- **1990-2002**: TYPES OF ARMED CONFLICT: 1 = NONE, 2 = INTERSTATE, 3 = REGIONAL AND/OR GENERAL CIVIL WAR, 4 = WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, 5 = MULTIPLE TYPES (PAWP, **2003**)

Rank	Case	Name	Category
3	15	TAJIKISTAN	Civil War
3	15	UZBEKISTAN	Civil War
1	88	KAZAKHSTAN	None

However, as shown above, between the years of 1990 and 2002, two out of the three countries have undergone a civil war, although none of the other sources support the claim that Uzbekistan under went a civil war despite minor clashes with Islamic extremist groups in leading up to September 11 and the global War on Terror. However, Tajikistan did go through a very long and bloody civil war that lasted from 1992 to 1997, which made Tajikistan a very special case because it was the only country to have under gone something close to a war of independence, which still has a lasting impact on the country both politically and militarily, in which Tajikistan avoid more blood shed whenever possible¹⁰⁴. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan has not experience any war since independence, and unlike Uzbekistan has been the furthest removed from the Islamic extremist activity, both internally and externally.¹⁰⁵

Despite the end of the Soviet Union and the Central Asian states being in command of fulfilling their own security and defense needs, “Russia remains a major arms merchant in the region, given the virtual dependence of all the Central Asia’s military on Russian (or more accurately Soviet) equipment.”¹⁰⁶ All of the equipment that has been, and still being used by the militaries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan

¹⁰⁴ Abdulleav, Kamoludin, “Integrating Political Islam in Central Asia: The Tajik Experience”, *Islam, Oil, and Geopolitics: Central Asia after September 11*, Ed. Elizabeth Van Wie Davis and Rouben Azzizian, Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham, 2007: 66

¹⁰⁵ Trough, Sergei, “China and Russia in Central Asia: Interests and Tendencies”, *Islam, Oil, and Geopolitics: Central Asia after September 11*, Ed. Elizabeth Van Wie Davis and Rouben Azzizian, Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham, 2007: 221

¹⁰⁶ Olcott: 190

come from Russia, mostly because the equipment is easily repaired or replaced from spare parts left over from the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁷ This means that all of the funds allocated from these countries government budgets, as the percentages are shown below;

MIL/BUDGET -- Military expenditure as a percentage of central government expenditure. (WDI, 2005)

Rank	Case	Name	Value
4	15	TAJIKISTAN	13.4
3	40	KAZAKHSTAN	5.7
	--	UZBEKISTAN	

All of the funds allocated from these countries Gross National Income (GNI) as indicated below;

MIL/GNI -- Military expenditures as a percentage of Gross National Income. (World Bank, 2001)

Rank	Case	Name	Value
2	23	TAJIKISTAN	1.70
1	28	KAZAKHSTAN	1.30
	--	UZBEKISTAN	

and all of the fund allocated away from the GDPs as indicated in Figure B.1, which as of 2005, 1.1% of Kazakhstan's GDP, 0.5% of Uzbekistan's GDP and 2.2% of Tajikistan's GDP;¹⁰⁸ a large portion went directly to Russia in order to have an equipped military, despite having nearly all of the equipment being from Soviet construction, which is not the best for a modern army. To illustrate this point, below is the amount of arms that are imported into Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, of which nearly all are from Russia and/or Soviet made.

ARMS IMP -- Arms imports (in constant 1990 US\$). Arms transfers cover the supply of military weapons through sales, aid, gifts, and those made through manufacturing licenses. (WDI, 2005)

Rank	Case	Name	Value
4	35	KAZAKHSTAN	69000000
3	73	UZBEKISTAN	5000000

¹⁰⁷ Olcott: 190

¹⁰⁸ United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2007 Data (build your own table): Military Data, http://hdrstats.undp.org/buildtables/rc_report.cfm

3 89 TAJIKISTAN 0

In 2006, Kazakhstan paid \$53 million (in constant with 1990 US \$) and Tajikistan paid \$13 million for imported arms for their respective militaries, according to Figure 1.B.¹⁰⁹ And even the United States even allows the Central Asian states to continue buying Soviet equip, as evident by the United States funding to allow Tajikistan to purchase all-terrain vehicles from Russia in 2004.¹¹⁰

In addition to having a military equipped with purely Soviet and/or Russian equipment, the military and its training facilities are filled with Soviet-era professional security officials who have a foundations in KGB training and tactics.¹¹¹ This is aided by the fact that Russia and Central Asia's national security organs are cooperating more and more, despite any other training activities from other allies and security organizations. This means that out of the military personnel in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, as shown below, all have had their basic training given to them by Soviet-era soldiers, maybe even former KGB officers.

MIL PERSON -- Total military personnel. (WDI, 2005)

Rank	Case	Name	Value
4	56	KAZAKHSTAN	100300
4	64	UZBEKISTAN	72000
1	139	TAJIKISTAN	7200

These figures have changed, as shown in Figure B.1, showing that in 2007, Kazakhstan has reduced its armed forces personnel to 66,000; Uzbekistan is down to 55,000; and Tajikistan is the only one to increase to 8,000.¹¹² But either way, all of these armed forces and military personnel have received Soviet style military training by Russians.

¹⁰⁹ Human Development Report 2007 Data: Military Data

¹¹⁰ Olcott: 190

¹¹¹ Olcott: 191

¹¹² Human Development Report 2007 Data: Military Data

However, not all of the funds allocated to be used for the militaries of Central Asia went to the Russians. As Figure B.2 shows, there are multiple places where funding ended up going to in order to promote various security programs. However, of the many listed only three are apart of the Department of Defense which are Comprehensive Threat Reduction, which received the highest amount of \$180.1 million; Counterproliferation (with the FBI), which got \$3.2 million, and Customs Border Security and Counterproliferation, which received the lowest at \$2.3 million over a nine year span from 1992 to 2001.¹¹³ At the same time there are several other programs that are equally important in promoting regional as well as national security, such as Arms Control Support and the Anti-Terrorism Assistance.

However this look into the spending, equipping, and training of the militaries of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan is only part of the story. A look into the alliances that were forged prior to September 11 and the war in Afghanistan that followed and the results of those alliances and consequences of the war in Afghanistan in Central Asia as a case study will help determine the if these militaries are weak.

1998 – Early 2001

What started as constant border disputes with China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan soon developed into interstate negotiations, which in 1996, with Russia's involvement as well lead to the signing of the Treaty Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions, which was signed in Shanghai, China.¹¹⁴ This treaty was the beginnings of an alliance amongst the five countries. After another treaty in 1997, it became clear that

¹¹³ Olcott: 258

¹¹⁴ Akcah, Pinar, "Nation-State Building in Central Asia: A lost Case?", Central Eurasia in Global Politics: Conflict, Security, and Development, Ed. Mehdi Parvizi Amineh and Henk Houweling: International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology, Brill, Leiden, Vol. 92, 2004:139

these five countries have the makings of a regional organization. “In July 1998, then Chinese president Jiang Zemin, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan and Yevgenii Primakov, representing the Russian president, met in Almaty, Kazakhstan, to discuss the strengthening of regional peace, stability, and economic cooperation.”¹¹⁵ This meeting resulted in the creation of the Shanghai Five, or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).¹¹⁶ The group would cooperate on matters concerning “common efforts to fight separatism, religious fundamentalism, terrorism, illegal arms trafficking, and the illegal drug trade as common threats to the region’s stability and security.”¹¹⁷ However, unlike many of the other organizations and alliances, the SCO stressed the idea that it was not a military alliance that demanded “unitary actions be taken by its members.”¹¹⁸

“The attacks of Islamic fundamentalists against Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000 led to the strengthening of military-strategic ties between Russia and these republics.”¹¹⁹ In response to these attacks, and the development of warmer relations between Uzbekistan and Russia,¹²⁰ in 2000, delegations from Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan determined that the growing threat of terrorism emanating from Afghanistan and other locations around the region, as well internally, that SCO would create the Antiterrorist Center, and it would work within the framework laid out by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which is an economic and military

¹¹⁵ Shaolei, Feng, “Chinese-Russian Strategic Relations: The Central Asian Angle”, Islam, Oil, and Geopolitics: Central Asia after September 11, Ed. Van Wie Davis, Elizabeth and Rouben Azizian, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2007: 207

¹¹⁶ Shaolei: 207

¹¹⁷ Shaolei: 207

¹¹⁸ Guang, Pan, “Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Challenges, Opportunities, and Prospects”, Islam, Oil, and Geopolitics: Central Asia after September 11, Ed. Van Wie Davis, Elizabeth and Rouben Azizian, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2007: 234

¹¹⁹ Lounev: 183

¹²⁰ Culter: 105

alliance among the former Soviet Union states.¹²¹ And then in June of 2001, along with the admission of Uzbekistan to the group (which is when the Shanghai Five changed their name) the SCO signed the “Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism.”¹²²

“The SCO is partially a functional international security regime, aimed at dealing with the common threat of the terrorist, separatist, and religious extremist forces faced by the six member states as well as attempting to secure the status quo in their mutual borders and handle potential dispute by peaceful consultations.”¹²³ As a result, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a very beneficial organization for Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan because of the security in knowing that China and Russia are like “big brothers standing shoulder to shoulder”¹²⁴ with them against the regional and global threats to their security and stability. Prior to September 11, the members of the SCO had a very loose alliance that was not greatly threatened by any other state actor or regional alliance, which allowed for the each state to handle internal problems individually and regional threats collectively.¹²⁵

Although the SCO was the strongest security alliance that Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had prior to September 11, it was not the only one. Since independence, these three nations have been apart of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), an alliance the former Soviet Union states. Through the Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, along

¹²¹ Shaolei: 205-206

¹²² Akcah: 139

¹²³ Yinhong, Shi, “Great Power Politics in Central Asia Today: A Chinese Assessment”, Islam, Oil, and Geopolitics: Central Asia after September 11, Ed. Van Wie Davis, Elizabeth and Rouben Azizian, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2007: 166

¹²⁴ Trough, Sergei, “China and Russia in Central Asia: Interests and Tendencies”, Islam, Oil, and Geopolitics: Central Asia after September 11, Ed. Van Wie Davis, Elizabeth and Rouben Azizian, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2007: 221

¹²⁵ Trough: 221

with Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia signed onto the Collective Security Treaty (CST) of the Commonwealth of Independent States in 1999.¹²⁶ Kazakhstan and Tajikistan were urged into signing onto the treaty in order to form a joint resistance to international terrorism.¹²⁷ “While Uzbekistan withdrew (along with Georgia and Azerbaijan) in 1999, the CST also conducted exercises focused on terrorism in 2000 and 2001.”¹²⁸ Although the CST has been active, Russia is the only state actor large enough to keep the organization together, which would give Russia more power.

As for military alliances with state actors there is the United States, which was slowly but surely coming into the region through loose connection and joint military training exercises. Starting in 1994, but not coming into full realization until 2001, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan joined forces with the United States, and provided “troops to the Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion that exercised with the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division.”¹²⁹ At the same time, as relations with Turkey started to grow, so did the involvement of NATO forces in Central Asia. As early as 1997, NATO started the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program, in which NATO troops and Central Asian troops would conduct joint training exercises.¹³⁰

And then there were the budding relations between Central Asia and India before September 11. Between 1999 and 2001, the presidents of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan visited India, and India returned the favor by sending senior officials to the two countries. This exchange of representatives was in hopes of future “coordinated efforts to counter

¹²⁶ Simons, Jr.: 272

¹²⁷ Shaolei: 206

¹²⁸ Simons Jr.: 272

¹²⁹ Simons Jr.: 272

¹³⁰ Hunter: 197

the threats emanating from Muslim extremists.”¹³¹ India, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan even signed agreements to work together to deal with terrorists that were freely crossing the borders between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which was threatening the stability and security of the entire region.¹³² However, these agreements and future coordinated efforts were never able to come into being because after September 11, every changed within the region.

Late 2001 - 2008

September 11 ushered in a new era for Central Asia, through the introduction of the United States, which up until this point had only played a minor role in the security element of Central Asia. However, with the War in Afghanistan, the United State’s military presence became a dominating factor. The regional powers, namely Russia and China, reacted about the same, whereas each of the Central Asian state had different reactions. Regardless, the United States moved into the region, setting up bases and establishing itself a regional power in a very short time. “The presence of the United States, in the form of bases, is perceived as just another form of Pax Americana imposing itself on the rest of the world”.¹³³

“Immediately after September 11, the whole world was with the United States in principle. Not only did NATO invoke Article 5, its collective self-defense clause, for the first time in history, but even Russia and China joined the cascade of immediate offers of support.”¹³⁴ Central Asia was also part of that cascade of offers. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan offered up air bases, Karshi-Khanabad and Manas respectively, in which the

¹³¹ Lounev: 178

¹³² Lounev: 178

¹³³ Lounev: 185

¹³⁴ Simons Jr.: 276

United States stationed at.¹³⁵ By January 2002, 1500 US military personnel in Uzbek's Karshi-Khanabad air base, and in return the United States gave Uzbekistan \$160 million.¹³⁶ These two air bases became the backbone for all of the United State military operations into Afghanistan.¹³⁷ In addition to the air base in Uzbekistan, the "United States-Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework" was signed by Secretary of State Colin Powell and President Karimov in early 2002, in which the United States agreed to provide political assistance to change Uzbekistan into a democracy so long as Uzbekistan allowed the United States to utilize the air base and provide military aid.¹³⁸

Kazakhstan and Tajikistan had relations with the sudden presence of the United States military. Between October 2001 and May 2002, Kazakhstan allowed over 600 coalition forays to cross their airspace.¹³⁹ And the United States had access to three air bases inside of Kazakhstan for emergency purposes only. In return, Kazakhstan received "military assistance designed to modernize their armed forces, which includes programs for training, improved border security, and the acquisition of military equipment."¹⁴⁰ Tajikistan on the other hand, hosted NATO air forces that would be flying operation in and out of Afghanistan.¹⁴¹ This was a tricky situation, because of close relationship

¹³⁵ Simons Jr.: 277 and Rumer, Eugene, "The United States and Central Asia: In Search of a Strategy", Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, Ed Eugene Rumer, Dmitri Trenin, and Huasheng Zhao, M.E. Sharpe, Amronk, 2007: 40

¹³⁶ Amineh, Mehdi Parvizi and Henk Houweling, "The US and the EU in CEA. Relations with Regional Powers", Central Eurasia in Global Politics: Conflict, Security, and Development, Ed. Mehdi Parvizi Amineh and Henk Houweling: International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology, Brill, Leiden, Vol. 92, 2004: 215

¹³⁷ Laumulin, Murat, "Kazakhstan and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia", Islam, Oil, and Geopolitics: Central Asia after September 11, Ed. Van Wie Davis, Elizabeth and Rouben Azizian, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2007: 253

¹³⁸ Rumer: 41

¹³⁹ Olcott: 183

¹⁴⁰ Olcott: 183

¹⁴¹ Trenin: 88-89

Tajikistani President Emomali Rakhmonov had with Russia and Iran, who did not approve of the sudden and imposing presence in Central Asia.¹⁴² After September 11, the United States started building up a “global antiterrorist coalition,”¹⁴³ which it did find some eager and will partners within Central Asia. Partnership with the United States for these three countries means aid and access to the United States’ military training and programs. An example of this is the United States being involved in Tajikistan in order to stem the tide of narcotic drugs that are coming from terrorist in Afghanistan that utilize Tajikistan as a gateway to Central Asia and Russia.¹⁴⁴ In return for technical support, the United States has access to Tajikistan’s highways that lead into Afghanistan.¹⁴⁵ Tajikistan, despite having a tricky situation diplomatically, would actually like to have the United States military have a stronger presence within their country, as a means of replacing the current Russian security forces.¹⁴⁶

In addition to the United States military anti-drug trafficking programs, Tajikistan, along with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have access to all the programs listed in Figure B.3.¹⁴⁷ There is also the access these three countries have to the over all aid the United States has been providing the region. Figure B.4¹⁴⁸ shows the amount the United States gave to each country in the form of military training and in the form of funding. Uzbekistan received the most for both training and funding. Kazakhstan and Tajikistan received a modest amount of training and aid. Figures B.5 and B.6 shows how much funding each country and to what area of need did the aid go to for 2003 and 2004

¹⁴² Trenin: 88-89

¹⁴³ Cutler: 108

¹⁴⁴ Olcott: 185

¹⁴⁵ Olcott: 185

¹⁴⁶ Olcott: 185

¹⁴⁷ Olcott: 257

¹⁴⁸ Olcott: 257

respectfully. It is important to note that in Figures B.5 and B.6¹⁴⁹, the line mentioning security and law enforcement does include the military.

The extended stay of the United States' military in Central Asia began to change the purpose of their mission from retaliation for September 11 to harbinger of democracy and change for all of Central Asia, and "the United States has actively claimed the role of regional security guarantor."¹⁵⁰ In addition to the multiple military bases and military agreements the United States has directly with nearly all of Central Asia, NATO forces are starting to move into the region. In July 2004, NATO announced a new "special forces" branch that will be active within Central Asia and the Caucasus region.¹⁵¹

However, the United States' presumption in its ability and right to promote democracy and being comfortable with its role as a security provider in Central Asia was met with opposition in 2005. After a serious military uprising in Andijan, Uzbekistan which resulted in the deaths and thousand more fleeing into neighboring Kyrgyzstan,¹⁵² the United States publically criticized Uzbekistan for the tragedy.¹⁵³ "The Andijon uprising triggered a full-fledged crisis in U.S. policy toward Central Asia. For Washington, the sharp deterioration in relations with Uzbekistan that followed mutual recriminations in the summer of 2005 had tangible and far-reaching consequences."¹⁵⁴ That same year, Uzbekistan requested that the United State's military and personnel vacate the Karshi-Khanabad air base,¹⁵⁵ despite how much the United States' operations in Afghanistan had a direct affect back in Uzbekistan by weakening the extremist Islamic

¹⁴⁹ Olcott: 256

¹⁵⁰ Laumulin: 253

¹⁵¹ Simons Jr.: 280

¹⁵² Trough: 223

¹⁵³ Cutler: 108

¹⁵⁴ Trough: 223

¹⁵⁵ Rumer: 52

Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU.)¹⁵⁶ This incident has caused the United States to be more protective over its last remaining air base and all of their other military partnerships in the region.

The United States is not the only military power to become active within the region after September 11 and the war in Afghanistan. Although, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was established prior to the events in 2001, however, its military aspect of the organization as well as the rest of the SCO was finally acted upon. In 2002, the Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was finally signed by the heads of state of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. At the same time, the organization announced the formation of a regional antiterrorist organization, and that the SCO was not the beginning of a bloc or a closed alliance.¹⁵⁷ Within the same year, China held joint counterterrorism maneuvers training and exercises with Kazakhstan's military, which allowed for the other SCO countries to hold counterterrorism exercises by 2003.¹⁵⁸ "In August 2003 China joined in the military exercises conducted within the framework of the SCO. The first phase of the exercises was in Kazakhstan, and the second in Xinjiang (at Yili). In September 2006, China and Tajikistan jointly conducted antiterrorist military exercises in Kuriab, Tajikistan."¹⁵⁹ The training exercises of 2003, which had five of the SCO members taking part, became known as the United 2003, and the training exercise "reinforced the five's quick-response capabilities against terrorists."¹⁶⁰ Then in 2005, the SCO created the Regional Anti-

¹⁵⁶ Trough: 225

¹⁵⁷ Shaolei: 211

¹⁵⁸ Simons Jr.: 284

¹⁵⁹ Zhao: 170

¹⁶⁰ Guang: 239

Terrorism Structure (RATs) in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.¹⁶¹ Also in 2005, Iran, India, and Pakistan were given observer status within the SCO.¹⁶²

And then there is Russia, which has had a continued military interest and presence within the region. In 2002, Russia started the Collective Forces of Quick Response (CFQR) of 1300 military personnel, which equals one battalion from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.¹⁶³ At the same time Russia creates bilateral agreements with Kazakhstan in June 1003 and Uzbekistan in 2005, “for political consultations, joint strategic assessment, joint military planning, and joint operations.”¹⁶⁴ The bilateral agreement with Uzbekistan was in the form of a treaty that was signed after the United States vacated the air base, and the treaty created a new deterrent against terrorist attacks because as stated in the treaty, an attack on Uzbekistan is also an attack on Russia.¹⁶⁵ At the same time, Russia’s 201st motorized infantry division acquired a military base within Tajikistan, because it is the only combat all-arms unit in the country, which aids as a deterrent for Islamic extremists from Afghanistan to think twice about entering Tajikistan.¹⁶⁶ “Russia also has a noncombat military presence in Kazakhstan, where it leases four test rangers, including Emba and Sary Shagan, which are used to test ABM systems.”¹⁶⁷

With the rise in military presence by the United States, Russia, and China through the SCO, it does increase the tension within the region that is deeply concerned in its

¹⁶¹ Cutler: 108

¹⁶² ¹⁶² Rahimov, Mirzohid, “From Soviet Republics to Independent Countries: Challenges of Transition in Central Asia”, *The Greater Middle East in Global Politics: Social Science Perspectives on the Changing Geography of the World Politics*, Ed. M. Parvizi Amineh, International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology, Brill, Leiden, Vol. 106, 2007: 299

¹⁶³ Amineh: 216

¹⁶⁴ Trenin: 101

¹⁶⁵ Trenin: 102

¹⁶⁶ Trenin: 102

¹⁶⁷ Trenin: 102

stability and security.¹⁶⁸ At the same time, Central Asia is surrounded by nuclear powers or countries who aspire to obtain nuclear weapons, so the introduction of yet another nuclear power,¹⁶⁹ just adds to the tension of the region. It is understandable that Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan would be eager to form partnership and agreements with the military presences because of the benefits of additional security as well as training and military supply exchanges. However, these three countries, as well as the rest of the region, must at all times be aware of indications of growth in power and presence by any of the current military presences, as well as the introduction of another military power, as these situations could disrupt the stability and security within the region.

When it comes to determining whether or not Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have weak militaries, one has to take into deep consideration the quality of the equipment and the methods that are used for their training. Having Soviet equipment and Soviet style training may be cost affective, but they are lacking in effectiveness in combating in modern-day warfare and combating terrorist groups. Even when conducting joint training exercises, even with the well funded United States military and the Russian military, the Central Asian armies still have to train with their dated equipment, putting them at a disadvantage. In order to compensate for the dated equipment, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have opened up their doors to other militaries, such as the United States and China through the SCO, in hopes that the dated equipment can be replaced and better training can replace the KGB style of maintaining security. However,

¹⁶⁸ Simons Jr.: 284

¹⁶⁹ Lounev: 182

the military alliances have proven to be helpful given the large amounts of joint training and military exercises have transpired since September 11. Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have to look elsewhere in order to provide for their own troops the proper equipment and training that would be beneficial and necessary to have a relatively strong army, so in this regard, these three countries have weak militaries. At the same time, since Russia is still a large part of the militaries of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan as well as there is a slow shift towards more involvements with other military powers. However, the shift is present and these three countries are affected by the military presence from other state actors aside from Russia, including the United States and China, and it is occurring on all three of levels, so therefore the military weakness is a sign of penetration.

Social Cohesion

There are some general attributes that have had a lasting effect on the Central Asian governments and societies. The largest and longest lasting is the residual of the Soviet Union. Since these countries were totally absorbed into the Soviet system¹⁷⁰, and were made to adopt the Soviet ideology, the traditional, or pre-Soviet, cultures were replaced in order to create a new national identity.¹⁷¹ However, after independence, each republic “had to adopt a policy of “de-Sovietization”, and to that end, the nationalizing elites have been removing the previous symbols and political representatives belonging to the Soviet era and replacing them with new “national” elites, distancing themselves from

¹⁷⁰ Myadar, Orhon, “The Legacy of Sovietism in Central Asia and Mongolia”, *Islam, Oil, and Geopolitics: Central Asia after September 11*, Ed. Van Wie Davis, Elizabeth and Rouben Azizian, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2007: 261

¹⁷¹ Myadar: 261

the previous regime and adopting national codes were inevitable.”¹⁷² Each Central Asian state had to reclaim their individual identity within the years following independence, which involved “creating an atmosphere of national glory and pride,” by using new state flags with new national symbols that would flown on new holidays celebrating the historical achievements and independence.¹⁷³

Aside from national pride, the governments had to start nation-state building for the first time in the region’s history. “In the post-Soviet era, nation building and state building go hand in hand, as there is now an attempt to build an independent state that derives its legitimacy and support from the nations.”¹⁷⁴ However, the nation-state building continues, which has caused the elites who obtained power within the government after independence to become entrenched with the notions that it is by their presence alone is what is gives the state an identity as well as stability.¹⁷⁵

STABLE.POL -- 2002: Environmental governance and institutions: Political stability and absence of violence (percentile rank from low to high) worst governance to best. (WRI, 2005)

Rank	Case	Name	Value
4	58	KAZAKHSTAN	66.67
2	136	UZBEKISTAN	21.05
1	138	TAJIKISTAN	19.88

As this shows, Kazakhstan is the only one with a high enough value (100 being the most stable) to qualify for being seen somewhat stable. However, the presidents of each state have quickly adapted more of an authoritarian mode of governance, just like what was found under the Soviet Union.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷² Akcah: 100

¹⁷³ Akcah: 102

¹⁷⁴ Akcah: 103

¹⁷⁵ Akcah: 112

¹⁷⁶ Akiner, Shirin, “Political Process in Post-Soviet Central Asia”, *Central Eurasia in Global Politics: Conflict, Security, and Development*, Ed. Mehdi Parvizi Amineh and Henk Houweling, International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology, Brill, Leiden, Vol. 92, 2004: 119

Despite attempts at removing the totalitarianism of the Soviet Union by establishing constitutions that promote democratic systems and separation of powers, the presidents have “been eroded by referendums, decrees, dubious legal rulings, and flawed electoral proceedings.”¹⁷⁷ The presidents have successfully connected themselves and their regimes to national security, meaning that the regime and the president are the only parts of the government that keep the country safe, and to criticize the president is seen as an attack on the country as a whole.¹⁷⁸ In addition to the linkage, there is no real freedom of the press and therefore there is no popular opponent or political rivalry that is main stream enough to unseat the president. Electoral opponents are hand picked, which starts at the top with the president, and moves down the administrative ladder, and completely circumvents the proper procedures that fosters jealousy and rivalries amongst individuals and departments in each Central Asian government.¹⁷⁹

CORRUPT 04 -- Governance quality in terms of control of corruption; a measure of the exercise of public power for private gain, including both petty and grand corruption and state capture, 2004. (WDI, 2005)

Rank	Case	Name	Value
1	152	KAZAKHSTAN	9.9
1	153	TAJIKISTAN	8.9
1	160	UZBEKISTAN	5.9

Regardless of the rampant corruption within the systems, which for Kazakhstan and Tajikistan is at very high levels, the heads of states justify it all because it keeps the regime in power which means that stability is preserved.¹⁸⁰

Even though these governments are being run Soviet style, the presidents are in fact indigenous to the country. Thus, to the minorities, the personalization of the government by and indigenous becomes a message of superiority, which only further

¹⁷⁷ Akiner: 121

¹⁷⁸ Akiner: 120

¹⁷⁹ Akiner: 121

¹⁸⁰ Akiner: 121

marginalizes the non-indigenous people. The governments have created “a new mechanism called “ethnocracies” political processes and executive and legislative policymaking minority groups not sufficiently represented nor influential.¹⁸¹ However, this tact only slowed the mass exodus of native Russians and Eastern Europeans who became frustrated and angered to have so little say in the new political system. Although these native Russians and Eastern Europeans are remnants of the Soviet system, they are Central Asia’s highly qualified professionals, which mean that when they migrate out of the country, they are removing from the society and region, their expertise which had been beneficial to the overall system. Central Asia is experiencing brain drain, with little hopes in completely stopping the drain.¹⁸²

Meanwhile Central Asia is looking to history for an identity, which brings up the deep cultural, historical, and traditional ties Islam has to the region.¹⁸³

%MUSLIM -- Percent of the population that is Muslim. (WCE 2001)

Rank	Case	Name	Value
5	27	TAJIKISTAN	83.6
5	32	UZBEKISTAN	76.2
4	40	KAZAKHSTAN	50.0

Islam for the region poses many problems, and despite the vast numbers of the Central Asian people are Islamic, as illustrated above, the presidents and their governments have all, except Tajikistan, the idea of integrating Islam into the political structure. However Islam is acknowledged as an integral part of the cultural heritage.”¹⁸⁴ In ignoring the strong ties to Islam, the presidents have created secular, democratic nation-states that have very unstable political systems, especially when considering the lack of political and civil freedoms in the region, as shown below.

¹⁸¹ Akcah: 111-112

¹⁸² Akiner: 132

¹⁸³ Akcah: 104

¹⁸⁴ Akcah: 104

POL RIGT -- Rating of political rights on a scale of 1 to 3 for the year 2004. (FITW 2005)

Rank	Case	Name	Category
5	1	UZBEKISTAN	Not Free
5	1	TAJIKISTAN	Not Free
5	1	KAZAKHSTAN	Not Free

CIV LIBS -- Ratings of civil liberties on a scale of 1 to 3 for the year 2004. (FITW 2005)

Rank	Case	Name	Category
5	1	UZBEKISTAN	Not Free
3	10	TAJIKISTAN	Part Free
3	10	KAZAKHSTAN	Part Free

And yet, despite the lack of political and civil freedom, the percentage of voter turn-out in these countries is surprisingly high, as shown below:

%TURNOUT -- Average voter turnout (in percent) since 1945. (IDEA, 2006).

Rank	Case	Name	Value
5	7	UZBEKISTAN	86.2
4	51	TAJIKISTAN	72.4
3	74	KAZAKHSTAN	64.3

This inconsistency in the general data maybe clarified through individual examination.

By looking at each of the political systems in as case studies in order to examine the government structure, the relationship between the government and the people, and the challenges that arise or quelled by that relationship, it will be easier to determine if the governments of each country is maintaining a level of social cohesion and well being.

Kazakhstan

The Kazakhstan government is composed of an executive branch, which has been held by President Nursultan Nazarbayev since independence; a legislative branch which is the Kazakh Parliament (Ulu Kenges); and a judiciary branch. The Kazakh governmental system is made up of a bicameral parliament full of supporters of the

president, which as a result has allowed for the increase in executive power.¹⁸⁵

“Kazakhstan’s president is a former Communist Party member, elite, and has been linked to previous regime, acquired even greater legitimacy as symbols of continuity in a time of flux and uncertainty.”¹⁸⁶ President Nazarbayev has no revolutionary credentials yet is regarded as guarantor of unity, independence, and stability within Kazakhstan.¹⁸⁷

Kazakhstan’s government system follows the secular model of Russia very well. As a result, Islamic groups moving into the region take on more of a missionary style than that of an active political organization.¹⁸⁸

Kazakhstan’s president embraced reform, but began to pass several mandates that extended the investigation into the manipulation of the electoral laws. In mid-2000, the Kazakh parliament granted the president with extraordinary powers and privileges for life regardless whether or not he steps down from office.¹⁸⁹ Meanwhile, the Kazakh Parliament (Ulu Kenges) has become a powerless part of the government “since they do not have the de facto power to withhold consent to decision making in the executive branch of the government.”¹⁹⁰ The only opposition stems from outside the government, by independent leaders who are also political elites from the Soviet era.¹⁹¹

In 2002 there were twenty political organizations that varied in their base. Most revolved around an individual of strength or wealth, some where favored the president, while the rest were based out of social movement trying to lobby the government.

¹⁸⁵ Akiner: 125

¹⁸⁶ Akiner: 120

¹⁸⁷ Akiner: 120

¹⁸⁸ Pomfret: 64

¹⁸⁹ Akiner: 123

¹⁹⁰ Akcah: 104

¹⁹¹ Akiner: 123

In the October 2000 election, there were ten of the twenty political organizations within Kazakhstan participated. The only one of any size and strength was the Republican People's Party of Kazakhstan, which withdrew its candidates on the eve of election because of harassment from the government.¹⁹²

According to Figure C.1¹⁹³, Freedom House Democracy Indicators Kazakhstan, on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is highest and 7 being the lowest, has been consistently approaching a score of 7 in the Electoral Process between 1998 through 2004, with a score of 6.50 for 2003 and 2004. In Civil Society has been consistent between 5.00 and 5.50 from 1998 to 2004. Governance has fallen from a rank of 5.00 in 1998 to 6.24 in 2004, and the score of Corruption, which starts in 1999, has been consistent between 6.00 and 6.50, despite approaching the lowest score. Overall, these scores are between 6 to 7, meaning that the Kazakhstani government is a very damaged political system, despite scoring around 5 for civil society, which is still low, but better than the government.

Kazakhstan's total population as of 2004 was 17 million people, of which 46% are Kazakh, 35% are Russian, 5% Ukrainian, 3% Volga Tatar, and the remaining 1% belongs to various other ethnic groups.¹⁹⁴ Judging by the percentage of the native Kazakhs and the Russians living within Kazakhstan, it becomes less shocking that Kazakhstan is the only republic with an ethnic conflict between the Russians and the indigenous people.¹⁹⁵ Relations between the two ethnic groups have begun to come to an understanding, as evidence by the President Nazarbaev declaration that "whoever tries to stir up discord and harmony between the Kazakhs and the Russians will be the common

¹⁹² Akiner: 127

¹⁹³ Olcott: 269

¹⁹⁴ Akcah: 110

¹⁹⁵ Akcah: 110

enemy of the two nationalities.”¹⁹⁶ However, Russians within Kazakhstan have never been granted dual citizenship by Kazakhstan.¹⁹⁷

In addition to the ethnic conflict, the Kazakh society has been living with strict limitations of civil freedoms. “President Nazarbaev has been very careful in his ethnic policies and attitudes emphasized that ethnic harmony is vital for Kazakhstan’s economic, political, and social development as an independent state harsh on extreme nationalist organizations such as the Alash.¹⁹⁸ However, the Kazakh constitution does not allow for grassroots organizations that criticize the government and/or represent an aspect of society; for fear that these organizations may undermine the stability of Kazakhstan.¹⁹⁹ At the same time, the Kazakh president’s family controls nearly all media outlets both in print and electronic, which diminishes opportunities to air independent views especially those that are critical of the president.²⁰⁰ Meanwhile, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are a relatively new phenomenon in Kazakhstan. NGOs have appeared promoting child support, women’s rights, civil liberties, environmental protection, and business training. However, these NGOs have ties with the government, in order to promote and campaign for policies issued by the executive.²⁰¹ Unlike Uzbekistan, the Kazakhstan president has more subtle tactics to discourage dissention, which hardly requires a show of any force.²⁰²

¹⁹⁶ Akcah: 110

¹⁹⁷ Akcah: 110

¹⁹⁸ Akcah: 110

¹⁹⁹ Akcah: 110

²⁰⁰ Akiner: 123-124

²⁰¹ Akiner: 126

²⁰² Akiner: 124

Tajikistan

Tajikistan, unlike any of the other Central Asian states, had a civil war, which prevented Tajikistan from having a president immediately after independence.²⁰³ In 1994, Imomali Rahmonov was elected to a 5 year term on a fairly slim margin. Immediately, the new and inexperienced president became a stooge for the powerful regional warlords. However, as the years progressed, Rahmonov was re-elected in 1999 with 97% of the vote and is stronger, has more political power, and an autocrat like the rest of Central Asia. And like all the other Central Asian presidents, Rahmonov amended the system to increase presidential power by marginalizing the parliament, depriving them of authority and placed the judiciary branch under presidential control.²⁰⁴ Also, the president extended the term to 7 years.²⁰⁵ At the same time, amendments to the constitution were made in 1999 to create a bicameral parliament for Tajikistan. However, the Tajik Supreme Legislature (Majlisi Oli) is less powerful than the president of Tajikistan “since they do not have the de facto power to withhold consent to decision making in the executive branch of the government.”²⁰⁶

Democracy appears to be taking shape as evidenced by the fact that referendums are held to approve amendments to the Tajik constitution. The People’s Party of Tajikistan/People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan is the only political party to survive the civil war. However by the election of February 2000 for the parliamentary seats, there were 10 active political organizations registered in the election. Three of the 10 won 5% of the vote, which was enough to win proportional representation in the Tajik

²⁰³ Akiner: 120

²⁰⁴ Akiner: 125

²⁰⁵ Akiner: 124

²⁰⁶ Akcah: 104

parliament.²⁰⁷ However, there is little turnout for elections of the president and members of parliament, which is because of blatant violations of election laws, such as bribery, intimidation, proxy voting, ballot stuffing, and falsification in election counts.²⁰⁸

According to Figure C.1, Tajikistan has been consistently scoring between 5.00 and 5.57 between 1998 for their Electoral Process, with the scores worsening in 2004 at 5.57. Civil Society has also been consistent scores of either 5.00 or 5.25 between 1998 and 2004, with the score improving in 2004 at 5.00. Governance has been drastically improving, with a starting score in 1998 at 6.57 and with an end score of 5.75 in 2004. Corruption has had a slight decrease in score from 1998 being at 6.00 and a 6.25 in 2004. Overall, according to Freedom House, Tajikistan has a better government system than Kazakhstan with scores staying within the 5 to 6 category. However, these scores overall reflect the struggling democracy that was formed after the civil war and the remnants of it since then.

Tajikistan's population of 6 million people was composed of 65% ethnic Tajik, 25% were Uzbek, 5% Pamiri, 2% Russian, in 2004.²⁰⁹ And of those 6 million people, as of 2003, 85% were Sunni Muslim, 5% were Shia Muslim, and the remaining 10% is a variety of other religions. With that much of the population being Muslim, it is no surprise that since independence, Tajikistan has been attempting to accommodate to the Muslim population. Tajikistan's official language switched from Cyrillic, the Russian alphabet, to Arabic.²¹⁰ However, after September 11, "President Rahmonov became more assertive in cleansing the government of opposition figures with tact support of the West,

²⁰⁷ Akiner: 127

²⁰⁸ Akiner: 126

²⁰⁹ Akcah: 111

²¹⁰ Akcah: 111

which approved of his secular position and mistrusted the Islamic parties, and his establishing governmental control; but warlords, outside the formal structure of the government or the pre-97 opposition, continued to operate their own account.”²¹¹

Despite the cleansing President Rahmonov wishes to partake in, under article 28 of the Tajik constitution, which states that “among others, parties of a democratic, religious, or atheistic character”, added in 1999, the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) became the first legal political party within quasi-democratic structures in Central Asia.²¹² “In comparison, the Tajik case has been an encouraging example of successful bargaining of the government and Muslim militants. It illustrates that Muslim politics is not inevitably radical and anti-systemic. So far, the legal recognition of Islamic policies has not led to the clericalization and a clash with secularism in Tajikistan.”²¹³

Uzbekistan

The Uzbek government consists of a very strong executive branch and a weaker legislative branch. The Uzbek Supreme Council has 250 members and is very similar to the Soviet model. The Supreme Council is not a standing governmental body, but meets regularly throughout the year with some sessions open to the public. The function of the Supreme Council is supposed to initiate and pass legislations, but because of the expanding executive branch, the Supreme Council merely approves laws drafted by the executive. And as of 2002, there have been no moves toward a bicameral system in the legislative branch.²¹⁴ The Uzbek Supreme Council has less power than the president of

²¹¹ Pomfert: 316

²¹² Abdullaev: 64

²¹³ Abdullaev: 74

²¹⁴ Akiner: 125

Uzbekistan “since they do not have the de facto power to withhold consent to decision making in the executive branch of the government.”²¹⁵

Meanwhile, Uzbek President Islam Karimov is regarded “to head a brutal and repressive regime which is known for mass arrests, torture, and banning religious organizations.”²¹⁶ President Karimov is a former Communist Party member, which was his greatest asset in order to become president after independence, but has been only been utilized in as a means to prove that he is a creditable and capable leader.²¹⁷ However, like his many counterparts, Karimov has no revolutionary credentials, and yet is able to keep his office as president of Uzbekistan, which is one of the most repressive governments in the Central Asian region.²¹⁸ In January 2000, Karimov won re-election with 90% of the vote against one challenger, and two years later had a referendum passed that extended the term to 5 to 7 years in office.²¹⁹

One of the themes that Karimov uses in order to justify his actions while as president is stability through unity. “The Uzbek Constitution states that “the people of Uzbekistan are the citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan, regardless of their nationality.”²²⁰ President Karimov emphasizes ethnic harmony and stability, calling for reconciliation if disagreements emerge between ethnic groups.²²¹ This means that any groups singling out different aspects of the Uzbek society will be treated as threat against the peace and security of the country.

²¹⁵ Akcah: 104

²¹⁶ Akiner: 122

²¹⁷ Akiner: 120

²¹⁸ Akiner: 120

²¹⁹ Akiner: 123

²²⁰ Akcah: 111

²²¹ Akcah: 111

According to Figure C.2, Uzbekistan score for Electoral Process have been consistent between 6.50 and 6.75 between 1998 and 2004, with the end score of 6.75 in 2004, showing a decrease in the category. Civil Society has been scoring between 6.50 and 6.75 between 1998 and 2004, with an ending score of 6.50 in 2004, which is a slight improvement from 2002. Governance has been scoring between 6.00 and 6.25 from 1998 to 2004, with an ending score of 6.25 in 2004, which is a slight decrease from 2002. Corruption has been consistently at 6.00 from 1999 to 2004. Overall these scores are the worse amongst the three countries, because Uzbekistan has been scoring between 6 and 7, which may reflect the repressive government under President Karimov.

Despite the fact that as of 2004, Uzbekistan's population of 23.5 million people was made up of 80% ethnic Uzbek, 5.5% were Russian, 10% were Tajik, 3% were Kazakh, 2.5% Karakalpak,²²² Uzbekistan still has a decent size minority within the country that is being under-represented when the attitudes of every citizen is Uzbek and therefore have the same needs and the same problems. There are few political parties that run in opposition to the standing government and president because of the lack of political liberation. The People's Democratic Party attempted to create pluralism. The exiled leaders of the Birlik and Erk parties have been attempting to create underground movements from afar.²²³ However, other Uzbek political movements are hesitant to be known because these groups will be subjected to harassment officially and unofficially by the government.²²⁴

There is one group, which was born out of the large, poorly under-represented Sunni Muslim population that even prior to September 11, the Muslim population was

²²² Akcah: 111

²²³ Akiner: 127-128

²²⁴ Akiner: 120

viewed as a volatile component of the society mostly because the sheer size of the population that could potentially be apart of any Islamic group that would change the status quo in the country, therefore undermining the stability through unity justification. One such group, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), became the first in Uzbekistan to challenging the status quo. Founded in 1998 by Takhir Yuldash and Namangani Jumabai, the IMU was known for its violent demonstrations against the government. "The organization first became known when it organized an assassination attempt on Islam Karimov in Tashkent in February 1999. The IMU member also took hostage four Japanese scientists in the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan in the same year."²²⁵ There have been claims that the IMU had very close connections to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, but these claims did not come into light until after September 11 and the United States' military presence in Uzbekistan.²²⁶ Unfortunately, as a result of the violent involvements of the IMU, the Uzbek government is now, more than very oppressive to any Islamic groups. A decree entitled "on liberty of conscience and religious organizations", which was issued on May 1, 1998, which outlined how the formation of Islamic groups was a criminal act because it disrupted the peace and harmony of the country, given that even in the constitution, the Uzbek government promotes unity through only one identity. As a result of this decree, 5,500 Uzbek citizens were arrested on charges of religious extremism in 1998, and several more fell victim to this decree in 2005 in Andijan.²²⁷

²²⁵ Akcah: 106

²²⁶ Akcah: 106

²²⁷ Abdullaev: 63-64

For Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, each government has a similar approach to maintaining peace and security in the region. All three strive to keep a level of stability, but each link the overall peace and security with political stability, which means, in like the case of Uzbekistan, using ever possible means to keep the same regime in control of the government, or, as in the case of Tajikistan, having complete control of the amount of plurality that occurs in within the political system. These governments do not seek out plurality and in many cases use subtle or overt methods in order to prevent civil groups to form and challenge the standing government. The lacks of true plurality within the government systems and within civil society have caused the ethnic and religious conflicts within each country, which is clearly evidence of lack of social cohesion. However, the only country that is directly involved with the domestic level of government is Russia, which is expected, given the close relations among the countries after independence and lingering social and political interests which are remnants of absorption, which unlike penetration involve completely overtaking another country where the conquering country's identity replaces the conquered country's identity. At the same time, countries like China and other South and Pacific Asian countries purposefully implement policies to prevent outside involvement at the domestic as a method to protect themselves as well as the other countries. This means that Russia may be the only country involved not because of lack of interest, because China, as addressed earlier, is very concerned with stability in Central Asia, but because it is their approach to other countries. At the same time, there is an absence of literature concerning the domestic interaction between the United States military and the domestic level of society and politics, which does not mean that there is no effect. Given the approach of China and the


absence of material on the United States, means that it may be too early to tell whether or not the lack of social cohesion is just remnants of absorption.

Strategic Vulnerability

Central Asia is a very strategically valuable location. As the map below illustrates, Central Asia is located between the Middle East and Eastern Asia, which has always been used as the main thoroughfare between the two regions, ever since the days of the Silk Road. China, the biggest country to border Central Asia to the east, has had a long time exchange with Central Asia. “China is closely interested in the stability and prosperity of the region because turbulence around that bridge would affect the future of political and economic cooperation on the whole Eurasian continent.”²²⁸ In addition to being the land bridge between east and west, Central Asia is also the land bridge between the north and the south, which was significant when Great Britain had colonized India, and Tsarist Russia was expanding its empire south through Central Asia, which ended up in a conflict between the two empires.

²²⁸ Shaolei: 207

IND DATE – YEAR OF INDEPENDENCE (TWF, 1997)




In addition to being a land bridge amongst the various regions of Asia, Central Asia is also located in the heart of the Eurasian continent, surrounded by and in close proximity to many of the regional and global powers. “Central Asia is the strategic backyard of every major power of Europe and Asia. China, India, Russia, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan all either share borders with the region or have strong interest in it otherwise.”²²⁹ The map below gives a larger scope in which Central Asia is situated on the continent. “It sits right between the European Union, Russia, and China.”²³⁰ Central Asia is in the middle of it all like a land bridge, which makes it very important and yet vulnerable to anything that occurs in the surrounding regions.

²²⁹ Rumer: 61

²³⁰ Shaolei: 209

IND DATE -- YEAR OF INDEPENDENCE (TWF 1996)



Central Asia has only grown more important. After September 11, Central Asia has become the frontline for the war on terror, and more specifically for the United States' war in Afghanistan, which is the country bordering the region to the south. "It is vitally important for the United States to control the "bridge" as an access to the Eurasian interior and maintain an advantageous position."²³¹ Even though the United States geographically is located far from Central Asia, geopolitically the United States has moved into the region. "The geopolitical and regional leaders are Russia, the United States, China, the European Union, Iran, Turkey, and the Central Asian countries."²³²

However, the war in Afghanistan has brought to light border security within and surrounding Central Asia. Russia, one of the most influential players in the region, is worried about the growing number of Muslim fundamentalists within the Central Asia, and what it would mean for not only the stability of the region, but also for Russia if the fundamentalists started crossing the border. As a result of the shared boarder and relative nearness these Central Asian states have to Russia, the Islamic movements become a real

²³¹ Shaolei: 209

²³² Laumulin: 253

concern that affects Russian policy, which in turn causes Russian relations to directly interact with the governments of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to take action to deal with these movements.²³³ The Russian-Kazakh border is 6,800 kilometers, and is very porous which might allow for Islamic fundamentalists to slip into Russia. And Russian troops have been unsuccessful in securing completely the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border.²³⁴ “In 2005 Russia and Kazakhstan signed and ratified a treaty to delimit their land border as well.”²³⁵

Competing for border security from Central Asia is China to the east. For China, instability in Central Asia could endanger the status quo in its restive western province, where the indigenous Turkic population has long resent Han Chinese domination and on occasion rebelled against it. Separatist contagion from Central Asia could be sparked by a spontaneous grassroots movement or instigated by a hostile power.”²³⁶ So, in order for there to be border security, China tries to ensure that the Central Asian states will not be caught up in power contentions and conflicting spheres of influence.²³⁷

“From Washington’s perspective, the worst imaginable turn of events would be a geopolitical wrestling match between Russia, China, Iran, India, Pakistan, and Turkey to gain control over Central Asia since that would upset too many other interests that the United States might have elsewhere.”²³⁸ As a result the United States is looking for a role in economic development and aiding in democratization in order to ensure a stable Central Asian region. The United States is not looking for “another Middle East,”²³⁹ and

²³³ Lounev: 176

²³⁴ Trough: 220

²³⁵ Trenin: 96

²³⁶ Rumer: 62

²³⁷ Shaolei: 208

²³⁸ Rumer: 30

²³⁹ Rumer: 36

become bogged down in another region. However, it would be in the United State's best interest to ensure that it is a part of the region, geopolitically speaking, especially with regards to the war on terrorism and the potential development and exportation of the energy sector.

Iran's key foothold within Central Asia prior to September 11 was Tajikistan because of strong cultural, linguistic, and ethnic ties. "The speed and eagerness with which the Tajik government made its facilities available to the U.S. military must have seemed the ultimate betrayal to Tehran."²⁴⁰ However, Tajikistan also opened its border to Russian and NATO troops as well, because of how porous the Tajik-Afghan border is. At the same time, the elimination of the Taliban is a mutually beneficial endeavor for Tehran, the United States, and the rest of Central Asian region.²⁴¹

And then there is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, who has done multiple joint military exercises and ventures to ensure the borders of Central Asia and the surrounding countries become that much more secure. Securing the borders of Uzbekistan is also very important because "it is the linchpin of regional stability;"²⁴² if Uzbekistan is taken over to Islamic extremists then the entire region falls because Uzbekistan border ever Central Asian state. The SCO has addressed this issue as much as possible, especially after 2005 when the United States left Uzbekistan. The SCO does not want the United States to become a member or even an observer because SCO is a vehicle in which Russia, China, and Central Asia, together can challenge the United States' sphere of influence.²⁴³ However, there have been multiple border disputes

²⁴⁰ Rumer: 47

²⁴¹ Rumer: 48

²⁴² Trenin: 87

²⁴³ Rumer: 57

amongst the Central Asian states themselves, such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in 1998, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in 2004, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in 2005, and Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in 2005²⁴⁴; it calls into question the effectiveness of the SCO, especially when it has declared itself as a military alliance.

In addition to border security and being a geographical/geopolitical bridge, Central Asia is also “a geographical sense but also in a political and cultural sense. Central Asia has been called a bridge between East and West.”²⁴⁵ Four civilizations, – Confucianism, Islam, Slavism, and Hinduism – converge in Central Asia, which gives Central Asian state an opportunity to become a center of dialogue and cultural cooperation amongst these civilizations.²⁴⁶ However the with the ingrained secularism left over from the Soviet Union and the rising threat of Islamic extremism, the possibility of peaceful cooperation amongst the various cultures may be stunted. The addition presence of the United States and its western influences also hinder this unique opportunity.²⁴⁷

Central Asia has always been a cross roads of sorts geographically, geopolitically, and culturally speaking. As such, Central Asia has adapted and changed with the convergence of the various civilizations. However with the recent (re)-introduction of military interests from the United States, Russia, and China, the region is even more at risk to falling under some form of domination, yet again, like under the Tsarist Empire or the Soviet Union. The fate of the regions’ stability, peace and security is dependent upon outside actors, which means that Central Asia is strategically vulnerable. And since the

²⁴⁴ Trenin: 96

²⁴⁵ Shaolei: 207

²⁴⁶ Guang: 236

²⁴⁷ Guang: 236

entire region's stability is at risk, this means that the individual countries: Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, are at risk as well. Since the strategic vulnerability affects all levels: state, regional, and international, and there is more than one outside state actor, then this is a sign of penetration occurring.

Conclusion

My research does support my main hypothesis. The first indicator, economic dependence was fully supported by the data and analysis that was examined. It was clear from the research that Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan were economically dependent upon state actors from outside the region at all levels of government: state, regional, and international. Also, the research showed that it was clearly not a case of absorption or remnants of absorption by Russia. Therefore the first hypothesis is supported. The second indicator, military weakness, showed that Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan were still highly dependent on Russia for military needs, which is a sign of remnants of absorption. However the data also showed that Russia was not the sole provider of military support, aid, and equipment to these three countries, and that the other state actor's military assistance was felt on the state, regional, and international level. Although the remnant is strong, it is too contested, which supports my second hypothesis. The third indicator did support the idea that there was clearly a lack of social cohesion, however, the social cohesion does not stem solely from interaction or interference by other outside state actors outside of Russia on an individual level. However, on the regional and international level there was the presence of outside state actors, and it was not just Russia. So, the data did support the null for the third indicator.

Perhaps there is not enough data or resources available to fully examine the individual level. And my fourth indicator, strategic vulnerability, showed that the interactions with outside state actors on the international and regional levels had state implications. Therefore, my fourth hypothesis was supported. Only one of the four hypotheses was not supported. However, my main hypothesis is supported by the data and analysis presented in this paper. The penetrated political system theory does apply to Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

Implications

I recommend to anyone attempting this endeavor first and foremost having a clear understanding of the enormity of the project. The indicators given cover a wide range of studies that require much research that perhaps I may not have been able to find within a year. Secondly, the ExplorIt program had gaps both in statistical data and also in dates, which may have affected the outcome of this analysis. By adding the case studies, it was my hope that the lack of statistical data from ExplorIt would not affect the outcome of my analysis. Also, I hope that the ExplorIt program is fully up to date for the next edition. Thirdly, I recommend anyone undertaking to perhaps narrow the time frame, or to examine more in depth each indicator, separating out the research into four individual papers.

APPENDIX A

b) Maddison's estimates of per capita GDP at PPP

Republic	1973		1990		1998				
	Pop.	GDP p.c.	Pop.	GDP p.c.	Pop.	GDP p.c.			
Central Asian Region	119.7	1,573	6,038	289.4	1,988	6,874	290.9	1,182	3,893
Afghanistan	11.6	103	7,793	16.7	122	7,203	15.6	73	4,009
Kazakhstan	3.2	12	3,702	4.4	16	3,592	4.7	19	2,032
Tajikistan	3.2	13	4,105	5.3	16	2,995	6.1	5	830
Turkmenistan	2.4	11	4,795	3.7	13	3,626	4.8	8	1,723
Uzbekistan	11.1	67	5,118	20.5	87	1,264	24.1	79	3,296
Armenia	2.7	17	6,189	3.3	20	6,142	3.8	13	3,341
Azerbaijan	5.7	14	1,138	7.1	33	4,681	7.7	16	2,135
Georgia	4.9	19	3,894	3.3	11	7,569	3.4	15	3,737
Jerusalem	3.2	16	3,284	10.3	73	7,153	10.2	59	3,743
Moldova	3.7	20	3,379	4.4	27	6,211	3.6	9	2,197
Russia	132.7	877	6,377	140.3	1,131	7,792	110.9	671	4,523
Turkmenistan	16.1	278	1,013	31.9	111	3,993	30.3	127	2,528
Ukraine	4.3	11	3,636	3.6	17	10,733	3.5	15	10,138
Yemen	2.4	19	7,710	2.7	26	9,841	2.1	13	6,216
Yemen	1.2	25	7,669	3.7	32	3,591	3.7	22	3,918

Note: Pop. = mid-year population in millions; GDP = gross domestic product in billion 1990 US dollars; GDP per c. = gross domestic product per capita, in 1990 international dollars.

Source: Maddison (2003), p. 117.

Table 12.2

Growth in real GDP 1989-2005 (percent)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Kazakhstan	0	0	-13	3	-9	13	8	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	63
Kyrgyz Rep	8	3	3	19	16	-20	5	7	10	2	1	1	44				
Tajikistan	3	-2	7	-29	-11	19	-13	4	2	5	1	44					
Turkmenistan	7	2	5	5	-10	17	7	7	11	5	16	61					
Uzbekistan	4	2	1	-11	2	4	1	2	3	4	1	94					

Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 2001 *Transition Report II*, April, London: EBRD, 15.

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Kazakhstan	2	3	10	11	10	9	9	9
Kyrgyz Rep	2	4	5	5	0	7	7	5
Tajikistan	5	4	8	10	9	10	11	8
Turkmenistan	7	17	19	16	8	8	7	7
Uzbekistan	4	4	4	4	3	2	6	4

Notes: 2001 = preliminary actual figures from official government sources. Data for 2002 represent European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) projections.

Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 2005 *Transition Report I*, May, London: EBRD, 13.

Figure A.3

Human Development Report 2007/2008

Human development index

MONITORING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: ENLARGING PEOPLE'S CHOICES

Indicators		Kazakhstan ^z	Uzbekistan ^z	Tajikistan ^z
GDP				
(current US\$ billions)	2005	57.1	14	2.3
GDP per capita, PPP				
(2005 international \$)	2005 ^a	7,857	2,063	1,356
GDP per capita, annual growth rate				
(%)	1975-2005	-2	-0.4	-6.3
	1990-2005	2	0.3	-4
Imports of goods and services				
(% of GDP)	1990	75	48	35
	2005	45	30	73
Exports of goods and services				
(% of GDP)	1990	74	29	28
	2005	54	40	54
Terms of trade				
(2000=100)	2004-2005 ^{b,c}			
Official development assistance received				
(net disbursements) (US\$ millions)	2005 ^d	229.2	172.3	241.4
Official development assistance received				
(net disbursements) (% of GDP)	1990 ^d			
	2005 ^d	0.4	1.2	10.4
Foreign direct investment, net inflows				
(% of GDP)	1990 ^e			
	2005 ^e	3.5	0.3	2.4
Private flows, other				
(% of GDP)	1990 ^{e,f}	0	0	0
	2005 ^{e,f}	11.9	-1.7	-0.1
Coal				
(% of total primary energy supply)	1990 ^{g,h}	54.2	7.3	11.2
	2005	52.6	2.2	1.3
Oil				
(% of total primary energy supply)	1990 ⁱ	28.2	21.8	36.8
	2005	14.5	12.1	42.6
Gas				
(% of total primary energy supply)	1990	14.5	70	24.8
	2005	33.5	84.6	14

Notes

- ¹ GDP values expressed in 2005 constant prices.
- ² The ratio of the export price index to the import price index measured relative to the base year 2000. A value of more than 100 means that the price of exports has risen relative to the price of imports.
- ³ Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified, unless otherwise noted.
- ⁴ ODA receipts are total net ODA flows from DAC countries as well as Taiwan Province of China, Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and other small donors, including East and West Germany.
- ⁵ A negative value indicates that the capital flowing out of the country exceeds that flowing in.
- ⁶ Other private flows combine non-debt-creating portfolio equity investment flows, portfolio debt flows and bank and trade-related lending.
- ⁷ Total primary energy supply (TPES) is made up of indigenous production + imports - exports - international marine bunkers ± stock changes. TPES is a measure of commercial energy consumption. In some instances, the sum of the shares by energy source may exceed 100%.
- ⁸ Coal and coal products.
- ⁹ Crude, NGL, feedstocks and petroleum products.
- ¹⁰ Data refer to a period shorter than that specified.
- ¹¹ Data refer to the closest available year between 1988 and 1992.
- ¹² Source:
- ¹³ ¹³ World Bank (2007b) World Development Indicators 2007 CD-ROM Washington, D.C.; aggregates calculated for HDRO by the World Bank.
- ¹⁴ ¹⁴ World Bank (2007b) World Development Indicators 2007 CD-ROM Washington, D.C.; aggregates calculated for HDRO by the World Bank.
- ¹⁵ ¹⁵ World Bank (2007b) World Development Indicators 2007 CD-ROM Washington, D.C.; aggregates calculated for HDRO by the World Bank.
- ¹⁶ ¹⁶ World Bank (2007b) World Development Indicators 2007 CD-ROM Washington, D.C.; aggregates calculated for HDRO by the World Bank.
- ¹⁷ ¹⁷ World Bank (2007b) World Development Indicators 2007 CD-ROM Washington, D.C.; based on data from UNCTAD; aggregates calculated for HDRO by the World Bank.
- ¹⁸ ¹⁸ World Bank (2007b) World Development Indicators 2007 CD-ROM Washington, D.C.; based on data from UNCTAD; aggregates calculated for HDRO by the World Bank.
- ¹⁹ ¹⁹ World Bank (2007b) World Development Indicators 2007 CD-ROM Washington, D.C.; based on data from UNCTAD; aggregates calculated for HDRO by the World Bank.
- ²⁰ ²⁰ World Bank (2007b) World Development Indicators 2007 CD-ROM Washington, D.C.; based on data from UNCTAD; aggregates calculated for HDRO by the World Bank.
- ²¹ ²¹ World Bank (2007b) World Development Indicators 2007 CD-ROM Washington, D.C.
- ²² ²² OECD-DAC (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee) 2007. Correspondence on official development assistance disbursed. May Paris, aggregates calculated for HDRO by OECD.
- ²³ ²³ ²³ calculated on the basis of data on ODA from OECD-DAC (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee) 2007. Correspondence on official development assistance disbursed. May Paris and GDP from V.
- ²⁴ ²⁴ ²⁴ calculated on the basis of data on ODA from OECD-DAC (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee) 2007. Correspondence on official development assistance disbursed. May Paris and GDP from V.
- ²⁵ ²⁵ ²⁵ calculated on the basis of data on foreign direct investment and GDP from World Bank (2007b) World Development Indicators 2007 CD-ROM Washington, D.C.
- ²⁶ ²⁶ ²⁶ calculated on the basis of data on portfolio investment and GDP data from World Bank (2007b) World Development Indicators 2007 CD-ROM Washington, D.C.
- ²⁷ ²⁷ ²⁷ calculated on the basis of data on portfolio investment, bank- and trade-related lending and GDP data from World Bank (2007b) World Development Indicators 2007 CD-ROM Washington, D.C.
- ²⁸ ²⁸ ²⁸ calculated based on data on primary energy supply from IEA (International Energy Agency) 2007. Energy Balances for OECD and non-OECD countries 2007.
- ²⁹ ²⁹ ²⁹ calculated based on data on primary energy supply from IEA (International Energy Agency) 2007. Energy Balances for OECD and non-OECD countries 2007.
- ³⁰ ³⁰ ³⁰ calculated based on data on primary energy supply from IEA (International Energy Agency) 2007. Energy Balances for OECD and non-OECD countries 2007.
- ³¹ ³¹ ³¹ calculated based on data on primary energy supply from IEA (International Energy Agency) 2007. Energy Balances for OECD and non-OECD countries 2007.
- ³² ³² ³² calculated based on data on primary energy supply from IEA (International Energy Agency) 2007. Energy Balances for OECD and non-OECD countries 2007.
- ³³ ³³ ³³ calculated based on data on primary energy supply from IEA (International Energy Agency) 2007. Energy Balances for OECD and non-OECD countries 2007.
- ³⁴ ³⁴ ³⁴ calculated based on data on primary energy supply from IEA (International Energy Agency) 2007. Energy Balances for OECD and non-OECD countries 2007.

Appendix 4. Multilateral Assistance

Table A4-1. Total Assistance, 1994-2004

(in millions of U.S. dollars)

	World Bank	IMF	ADB	USAID
Kazakhstan	1,248.8	0.4	822.0	448.3
Kyrgyzstan	443.6	206.7	168.0	318.1
Tajikistan	193.3	134.1	272.9	226.3
Turkmenistan	32.1	—	—	65.7
Uzbekistan	301.8	165.2	971.6	310.0

Sources: World Bank website, www.worldbank.org; International Monetary Fund website, www.imf.org; Asian Development Bank website, www.adb.org; U.S. Agency for International Development website, www.usaid.gov.

Table A4-2. Average Multilateral Aid per Capita, 1994-2004

(in U.S. dollars)

	World Bank	IMF	ADB	USAID
Kazakhstan	86.72	0.03	57.08	31.13
Kyrgyzstan	92.42	43.06	35.00	66.27
Tajikistan	29.74	20.63	41.98	34.82
Turkmenistan	5.35	—	—	10.95
Uzbekistan	11.61	6.35	37.37	11.92

Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Transition Report 2004* (London: November 2004). Based on 2004 population estimates.

Table A5-2. USAID Assistance, 1992-2005

(in millions of U.S. dollars)

	Combined					Total FY2005 Request
	Total FY1992-2000	Total FY2001	Total FY2002	Total FY2003	Total FY2004	
Kazakhstan	273.0	48.8	49.7	43.4	33.3	28.0
Kyrgyzstan	141.5	32.6	71.2	36.9	35.9	33.0
Tajikistan	47.2	29.4	82.2	35.9	31.7	35.0
Turkmenistan	33.9	6.1	12.1	7.8	5.8	6.0
Uzbekistan	83.9	26.0	124.9	39.4	35.7	36.0

Source: Eurasia Program Summary, available at www.usaid.gov.

Note: The higher 2002 figures reflect one-off supplemental disbursement of additional Freedom Support Act funds for each country.

Table A6-5. Average Annual State Department and USAID Aid Before and After 9/11

	Average 1992-2001	Average 2002-2003
USAID	52.7	90.3
Economic Reform	12.2	5.4
Private-Sector Initiatives	14.7	44.1
Democratic Reform	7.5	21.8
State Dept.	9.0	20.4

Notes:

Budget categories vary from year to year.

The only available FY2004 numbers can be found in Table A5-4

As this book went to press, FY 2005 numbers were not yet available. They are expected in July 2005.

Sources: www.state.gov and www.usaid.gov.

Figure A.7

Appendix 5. U.S. Government Assistance Before and After 9/11


Table A5-1. U.S. Government Aid Allocations, FY1995-FY2005
(in millions of U.S. dollars)

Country	FY1995	FY1996	FY1997	FY1998	FY1999	FY2000	FY2001	FY2002	FY2003 (budgeted)	FY2004 (estimate)	FY2005 (request)
Kazakhstan	47.2	33.0	35.4	40.3	50.5	44.8	71.5	81.6	100.4	41.6	40.2
Kyrgyzstan	22.7	19.0	20.8	24.3	32.0	30.1	40.6	49.0	54.7	43.2	39.5
Tajikistan	9.2	4.0	5.0	12.0	13.1	9.9	56.4	85.3	49.4	32.5	36.4
Turkmenistan	5.4	4.0	5.0	5.3	11.3	6.2	12.2	16.4	11.0	8.6	9.3
Uzbekistan	11.8	19.0	21.6	20.5	27.3	20.0	55.9	161.8	83.5	48.4	53.2

Source: Congressional Research Service.

Figure A.8

Figure A5-1. Average of U.S. Government Aid Allocations before and after 9/11
(in millions of U.S. dollars)




Source: Congressional Research Service.

Note: Average before 9/11 is FY 1995-2001; average after 9/11 is FY 2002-2005.

Figure A.9

Figure A5-2. Average of USAID Assistance before and after 9/11

(in millions of U.S. dollars)



Source: Eurasia Program Summary, available at www.usaid.gov.

Note: Average before 9/11 is FY 1992-2001; average after 9/11 is FY 2002-2005.

Table 12.4

International trade, 1993-2003 (million US dollars)

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	
Exports												
Kazakhstan	1,107	3,227	5,270	5,926	6,197	5,511	5,548	4,876	4,685	9,670	14,875	
Kyrgyz Rep	390	339	483	506	600	509	451	501	176	486	622	
Tajikistan	350	492	749	772	803	597	689	770	652	737	719	
Turkmenistan	561	1,163	1,881	1,693	751	591	1,187	2,505	2,555	2,710	2,049	
Uzbekistan	693	1,991	2,718	2,620	2,896	2,310	1,963	2,132	2,097	1,578	1,998	
Imports												
Kazakhstan	1,701	3,285	3,307	4,247	4,302	4,373	3,686	5,048	6,478	6,591	9,377	
Kyrgyz Rep	447	316	392	795	709	811	611	555	165	387	288	
Tajikistan	532	515	810	668	750	711	683	671	630	710	881	
Turkmenistan	386	904	1,361	1,313	1,238	1,007	1,176	1,788	2,210	1,819	1,964	
Uzbekistan	918	2,455	3,030	4,854	4,538	2,951	2,181	2,067	2,293	2,107	2,510	

Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics.

Appendix 8. Major Joint Venture Projects

Kazakhstan

Project	Partners	Key Information
Tengiz oil field	TengizChevroil (TCO) 50% ChevronTexaco (US) 25% Kazakhoil 25% ExxonMobil (US) 5% LUKoil (Russia)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Launched in 1993 as a joint Kazakh–U.S. 40-year venture • Estimated cost: \$20 billion • Main fields: Tengiz and Korolev—6-9 billion barrels of reserves
Kashagan offshore oil field	Agip KCO (formerly known as OKIOC) 18.52% ENI (Italy) 18.52% ExxonMobil (US) 18.52% Royal Dutch/Shell (UK-Netherlands) 18.52% TotalFinaElf (France) 9.26% ConocoPhillips (US) 8.33% Inpex (Japan) 8.33% KazMunayGaz	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kashagan is thought to hold between 9 and 13 billion barrels of recoverable reserves, making it roughly the world's 5th largest. • Assuming proven crude oil reserves in the neighborhood of 8 billion barrels, the Kashagan field alone would hold roughly the same amount of oil as Brazil, South America's second largest oil producer. • ENI (formerly Agip) operates the site. • First oil was due in 2005; now that has been pushed back to 2007 or 2008 due to disagreements between the Kazakh government and the foreign operators. • The initial development phase at Kashagan may cost the consortium \$9 billion, making it the largest undertaking in the world's oil business today. • The field is projected to pump 3 million barrels per day by 2015. • Eni, Conoco, Inpex, and Total also own stakes in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project.
Karachaganak oil and gas field	Karachaganak (KIO) 32.5% British Gas 32.5% ENI 20% ChevronTexaco 15% LUKoil	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Launched November 1997 • Oil reserves: 2 billion barrels • Gas reserves: 28 trillion cubic feet
Pipeline from Tengiz to Novorossiisk	Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) 24% Russia 19% Kazakhstan 15% Chevron-Texaco 12.5% LUKArco 7.5% ExxonMobil 7% Oman	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Launched in 1999 • Estimated cost of first phase: \$2.6 billion • Project includes a 1510-km pipeline that became operational in 2001. • At peak, 1.2 million barrels per day will be pumped from Tengiz to Novorossiisk on the Black Sea.

Kyrgyzstan

Project	Partners	Key Information
Kumtor gold mine	<p>Centerra Gold Inc. 54% Cameco (Canada) 16% Kyrgyz government</p> <p>* Remainder is traded on the open market; Centerra listed on the Toronto stock exchange in June 2004.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kyrgyz government reduced its stake from 27% to 16% by selling 7.5 million shares of stock, reaping \$116 million. • Mine located southeast of Bishkek in the Tien Shan mountains, 60 km from Chinese border. • Estimated deposits of about 700 metric tons. • Image tainted by incident in May 1998, when a truck accident caused an estimated 2 tons of cyanide to spill into the Barskoon River, hospitalizing some 1,000 local people. • Kumtor revenues constituted 7% of GDP in 2003, but is expected to close by 2010.

Tajikistan

Project	Partners	Key Information
Sangtuda hydropower station	RAO-UES (Russia), Iran, Tajik government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Under protocol signed January 2005. Russia and Tajikistan will build the Sangtuda-1 facility and Iran and Tajikistan will build Sangtuda-2. • Construction of Sangtuda was launched in 1989 but interrupted by civil war in 1992. • Projected cost to complete: \$500 million over four years. • Located on the Vaksh River 125 miles south of Dushanbe. • Project will allow Tajikistan to fully meet its own electricity needs and sell to neighbors Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Rugun hydropower station	Russian Aluminum	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RusAl agreed in October 2004 to invest \$560 million of the total \$600 million needed to construct the Rugun facility, which will provide cost-effective power for RusAl's planned aluminum processing plants throughout the country. • Tajik Economy Minister Halim Soliev told Russian newspaper <i>Vedomosti</i> at the time that RusAl's total investment in Tajikistan over the next seven years will total \$1.6 billion.

Turkmenistan

Project	Partners	Key Information
Cheleken	Dragon Oil (Ireland-UAE)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proven reserves: 600 million barrels • 2004 production: 10,000 barrels per day • 25-year production sharing agreement with Turkmen government from 1993 covers two offshore deposits: Jeikhun and Jigalybek
Nebit Dag	Burren Energy (UK)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proven reserves: 100 million barrels • 2004 production: 10,000 barrels per day

Uzbekistan

Project	Partners	Key Information
Central Ustyurt & Southwest Gissar oil and gas fields	UzPEC Ltd. Subsidiary of Trinity Energy (UK)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Projected by 2006: 2,600 barrels per day of oil and 71 billion cubic feet (2 billion cubic meters) of gas. • Projected direct investment: \$400 million. • In 2001, Trinity signed a 40-year production sharing agreement with national holding company Uzbekneftegaz—the country's first PSA—for the oil and gas deposits at Ustyurt and Gissar (also called Pamiro-Alai).
Muruntau goldmine	Zarafshan-Newmont JV 50 % Newmont Mining (U.S.) 50 % Uzbekistan-Navoi Mining (private) and Goskomgeologia (state)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Estimated cost of JV: \$250 million • Muruntau, meaning "hilly place," and the nearby town of Zarafshan are located 250 miles west of Tashkent in the Kyzylkum desert. • The open-pit mine has been in operation since 1969. • JV produced its first gold in 1995, scheduled to operate through 2011. • Colorado-based Newmont estimates that the JV has pumped \$500 million into the Uzbek economy (www.newmont.com).

Table 14.2

Proven oil and natural gas reserves in the Caspian Sea Region, Europe, US and Middle East, 2005

Country	Proven Oil Reserves billion bbl	Proven Natural Gas Reserves (tcf)
Caspian Sea Region		
Azerbaijan	7.0	48.4
Kazakhstan	39.6	105.9
Turkmenistan	0.5	102.4
Iran	137.5	943.9
Russia	74.4	1,688.0
Total	259.0	2,888.6
Europe	21.1 (OECD Europe)	200.6 (EU 25: 90.8)
US	29.3	192.5
Middle East	605.2	2642.1
Total	654.8	3,035.2

Source: British Petroleum, 2006 *BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2006*.

Kazakhstan Energy

Data

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Petroleum (Thousand Barrels per Day)						
Total Oil Production (Production of crude oil including lease condensate, natural gas plant liquids, and other liquids, and refinery processing gain (loss). Negative value indicates refinery processing loss.)	442.6	406.73	416.47	414.79	458.77	522.03
Crude Oil Production (Includes lease condensate.)	444	408	415	414	456.75	521
Consumption (Consumption of petroleum products and direct combustion of crude oil.)	404	341	298	269	245	218
Net Exports/Imports(-) (Net Exports = Total Oil Production-Consumption. Negative numbers are Net Imports.)	38	65	119	146	214	305
Total Oil Exports to U.S. (Total crude oil and petroleum products. Data through 2007 is currently available.)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Refinery Capacity (Crude oil distillation capacity as of January 1. Sources: U.S. data from EIA; Other countries from Oil & Gas Journal.)	NA	390	390	394	394	427
Proved Reserves (Billion Barrels) (As of January 1. Sources: U.S. data from EIA; Other countries from Oil & Gas Journal.)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	5.417
	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Natural Gas (Billion Cubic Feet)						
Production (Dry natural gas.)	286.1	236.6	158.9	169.2	149.7	215.4
Consumption (Dry natural gas.)	709.8	522.7	529.7	383.4	510	494.4
Net Exports/Imports(-) (Net Exports = Exports-Imports. Negative numbers are Net Imports. Note: Data range begins with the year 1990.)	-286.1	-370.8	-314.3	-360.2	-279	-279
Proved Reserves (As of January 1. Sources: U.S. data from EIA; Other countries from Oil & Gas Journal.)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	65000
Coal (Million Short Tons)						
Production (Production of primary coal: includes anthracite, bituminous, lignite, and for Estonia, oil shale.)	139.5	123.3	115.3	93.1	86	80.1
Consumption (Consumption of primary coal (includes anthracite, bituminous, lignite, and for Estonia, oil shale) and net imports of metallurgical coke.)	100.9	91.5	87.6	72.4	64.7	54.2
Net Exports/Imports(-) (Billion Btu) (Net Exports = Exports-Imports. Negative numbers are Net Imports. Includes primary coal and metallurgical coke.)	579.8	498.1	455.5	338.5	368.4	429.1
Electricity (Billion Kilowatthours)						
Net Generation (Conventional thermal electricity, hydroelectric power, nuclear electric power, and geothermal, solar, wind, and wood and waste electric power generation.)	78.6	73.6	63.2	63.2	56	49.5
Net Consumption (Net generation+electricity imports-electricity exports-electricity distribution losses.)	82.9	79.3	59.8	58.5	52.1	45
Installed Capacity (Gw) (One billion watts or one thousand megawatts of electric capacity, as of January 1.)	18.9	18.9	18.6	19.1	19.1	17.5
Total Primary Energy (Quadrillion Btu)						
Production (Production of petroleum (crude oil and natural gas plant liquids), dry natural gas, and coal, and net generation of hydroelectric, nuclear, and geothermal, solar, wind, and wood and waste electric power.)	3.6	3.3	2.6	2.3	2.4	2.5
Consumption (Consumption of petroleum, dry natural gas, and coal, and net hydroelectric, nuclear, and geothermal, solar, wind, and wood and waste electricity. Also includes net electricity imports.)	3.4	2.9	2.3	1.9	2	1.7
Energy Intensity (Btu per (2000) U.S. Dollars) (Total primary energy consumption per dollar of gross domestic product using purchasing power parities.)	40610.9	38263.9	34054.5	30789.3	31578.9	26710.2

Carbon Dioxide Emissions (Million Metric Tons of CO₂)

Total from Consumption of Fossil Fuels

(Emissions from the consumption of petroleum, natural gas, and coal and the flaring of natural gas.)

265.09	227.54	168.18	140.11	142.34	120.1
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-- = Not applicable; NA = Not available; F
= Forecast value

Sources: EIA, International Energy Annual,
Short Term Energy Outlook, Table 3a,
Table 3b (Forecast values)

1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
526.9	604.92	725.63	835.97	967.51	1061.97	1245.87	1337.17	1387.22	1444.23	1429.31
526	603.6	718	814.86	939.19	1026.71	1203.25	1288.28	1313.33	1360.42	1345.42
197	171	195	210	217	207	221	229	234	231	F 239
330	434	531	626	750	855	1025	1108	1153	1213	F 1191
0	0	0	1	0	0	12	21	11	19	NA
427	427	427	427	427	427	427	345	345	345	345
5.417	5.417	5.417	5.417	5.417	9	9	9	9	30	30
1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
194.2	162.4	314.3	356	462.6	490.2	723.6	934.8	905.8	984.6	NA
473.2	480.3	490.9	505	526.2	557.3	811.9	1075.3	1096.5	1079.9	NA
-317.8	-176.6	-148.3	-63.6	-67.1	-88.3	-140.6	-190.7	-95.4	NA	
65000	65000	65000	65000	65000	65000	65000	65000	65000	100000	100000
78.1	65.9	81.7	87.2	81.3	93.6	95.8	95.4	106.1	95.2	NA
54.4	51	55.4	57	58.6	66.6	69	70.4	75.9	74.3	NA
393.2	278.9	443.1	486.8	376.5	425.7	428.6	411.6	499.1	343.8	NA
46.6	45	48.9	52.4	55.3	60.4	62.3	64.2	67.8	NA	NA
42	39.8	44.8	47.8	49.8	52.7	53.3	58	61.8	NA	NA
17.5	17.4	16.3	18.1	18.4	18.6	18.7	18.8	18.7	0	NA
2.4	2.6	3.3	3.7	4	4.4	5.1	5.5	5.7	NA	NA
1.6	1.8	1.9	2	2.1	2.2	2.5	2.9	3	NA	NA
26213.7	28130.6	27695.3	25265.2	23950.7	23273.5	24287.6	24922.8	23494.2	NA	NA

116.28	133.39	143.45	147.69	153.77	165.91	185.37	203.3	213.5	NA	NA
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Tajikistan Energy Data	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Petroleum (Thousand Barrels per Day)						
Total Oil Production (Production of crude oil including lease condensate, natural gas plant liquids, and other liquids, and refinery processing gain (loss). Negative value indicates refinery processing loss.)	1.31	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.63	0.63
Crude Oil Production (Includes lease condensate.)	1.08	0.57	0.4	0.5	0.42	0.52
Consumption (Consumption of petroleum products and direct combustion of crude oil.)	20	15	12	13	15	17
Net Exports/Imports(-) (Net Exports = Total Oil Production-Consumption. Negative numbers are Net Imports.)	-18	-15	-11	-12	-15	-16
Refinery Capacity (Crude oil distillation capacity as of January 1. Sources: U.S. data from EIA; Other countries from Oil & Gas Journal.)	NA	0	0	0	0	0
Proved Reserves (Billion Barrels) (As of January 1. Sources: U.S. data from EIA; Other countries from Oil & Gas Journal.)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.012
	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Natural Gas (Billion Cubic Feet)						
Production (Dry natural gas.)	3.5	0	1.2	1.4	1	1.4
Consumption (Dry natural gas.)	67.1	49.4	56.5	28.5	43.4	40.3
Net Exports/Imports(-) (Net Exports = Exports-Imports. Negative numbers are Net Imports. Note: Data range begins with the year 1990.)	-49.4	-56.5	-27.1	-42.4	-38.8	-37.4
Proved Reserves (As of January 1. Sources: U.S. data from EIA; Other countries from Oil & Gas Journal.)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	200
Coal (Million Short Tons)						
Production (Production of primary coal: includes anthracite, bituminous, lignite, and for Estonia, oil shale.)	0.2	0.2	0.1	0	0	0
Consumption (Consumption of primary coal (includes anthracite, bituminous, lignite, and for Estonia, oil shale) and net imports of metallurgical coke.)	0.5	0.1	0.1	0	0	0
Net Exports/Imports(-) (Trillion Btu) (Net Exports = Exports-imports. Negative numbers are Net Imports. Includes primary coal and metallurgical coke.)	-9.1	0.5	0.4	0	0	-0.5
Electricity (Billion Kilowatthours)						
Net Generation (Conventional thermal electricity, hydroelectric power, nuclear electric power, and geothermal, solar, wind, and wood and waste electric power generation.)	16.6	17.5	16.8	14.6	14.8	13.9
Net Consumption (Net generation+electricity imports-electricity exports-electricity distribution losses.)	16.2	14.2	13.8	13.7	13.4	12.9
Installed Capacity (Gw) (One billion watts or one thousand megawatts of electric capacity, as of January 1.)	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4
Total Primary Energy (Quadrillion Btu)						
Production (Production of petroleum (crude oil and natural gas plant liquids), dry natural gas, and coal, and net generation of hydroelectric, nuclear, and geothermal, solar, wind, and wood and waste electric power.)	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1
Consumption (Consumption of petroleum, dry natural gas, and coal, and net hydroelectric, nuclear, and geothermal, solar, wind, and wood and waste electricity. Also includes net electricity imports.)	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2
Energy Intensity (Btu per (2000) U.S. Dollars) (Total primary energy consumption per dollar of gross domestic product using purchasing power parities.)	47391.4	47086.8	57234.6	53897.2	71288.7	66796.7
Carbon Dioxide Emissions (Million Metric Tons of CO2)						

Total from Consumption of Fossil Fuels

(Emissions from the consumption of petroleum, natural gas, and coal and the flaring of natural gas.)

7.97 5.23 5.07 3.6 4.71 4.77

-- = Not applicable; NA = Not available; F
= Forecast value

Sources: EIA, International Energy Annual,
Short Term Energy Outlook, Table 3a,
Table 3b (Forecast values)

1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
0.5	0.5	0.39	0.33	0.31	0.35	0.25	0.28	0.3	0.28	0.24
0.4	0.4	0.36	0.33	0.31	0.35	0.25	0.28	0.3	0.28	0.24
19	21	23	25	25	27	29	32	33	34	F 36
-19	-21	-23	-25	-25	-27	-29	-31	-33	-34	F - 36
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012
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1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------

2.1	2.1	1.4	1.8	0.7	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.1	NA
39.6	41.3	44.1	45.9	42	47.7	49.1	50.5	45.1	29.7	NA

-39.2	-42.7	-44.1	-41.3	-46.3	-47.7	-49.1	-43.8	-28.6	NA	
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200	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	200
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0	0	0	0	0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	NA
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0	0	0	0	0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	NA
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-0.3	-0.1	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	NA
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14.3	15.6	14.1	14.2	15.1	16.3	16.3	16.9	17	NA	NA
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12.8	13.1	13.4	13.2	14.1	13.8	14.1	14.5	15	NA	NA
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4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	0	NA	NA
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0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	NA	NA
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0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	NA	NA
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65607.8	67560.7	61693.7	57776.4	53041.4	51692	47265.6	46140.5	42825.1	NA	NA
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5.12 5.54 5.95 6.18 6.04 6.65 7.04 7.46 7.36 NA NA

Uzbekistan Energy

Data

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Petroleum (Thousand Barrels per Day)							
Total Oil Production (Production of crude oil including lease condensate, natural gas plant liquids, and other liquids, and refinery processing gain (loss). Negative value indicates refinery processing loss.)	66.16	85.7	115.43	160.32	163.95	157.45	161.15
Crude Oil Production (Includes lease condensate.)	35.55	47	75	115	114.75	112.35	116
Consumption (Consumption of petroleum products and direct combustion of crude oil.)	190	179	173	185	144	140	147
Net Exports/Imports(-) (Net Exports = Total Oil Production-Consumption. Negative numbers are Net Imports.)	-124	-93	-57	-24	20	18	14
Refinery Capacity (Crude oil distillation capacity as of January 1. Sources: U.S. data from EIA; Other countries from Oil & Gas Journal.)	NA	173	173	175	175	175	288
Proved Reserves (Billion Barrels) (As of January 1. Sources: U.S. data from EIA; Other countries from Oil & Gas Journal.)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.594	0.594
	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Natural Gas (Billion Cubic Feet)							
Production (Dry natural gas.)	1511.5	1589.2	1666.9	1695.1	1695.1	1737.5	1935.3
Consumption (Dry natural gas.)	1094.8	1540.8	1229	1349	1433.8	1455	1409.1
Net Exports/Imports(-) (Net Exports = Exports-Imports. Negative numbers are Net Imports. Note: Data range begins with the year 1990.)	409.7	437.9	346.1	261.3	282.5	526.2	540.3
Proved Reserves (As of January 1. Sources: U.S. data from EIA; Other countries from Oil & Gas Journal.)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	66200	66200
Coal (Million Short Tons)							
Production (Production of primary coal: includes anthracite, bituminous, lignite, and for Estonia, oil shale.)	5.1	4.2	4.2	3.4	3.1	3.2	3.2
Consumption (Consumption of primary coal (includes anthracite, bituminous, lignite, and for Estonia, oil shale) and net imports of metallurgical coke.)	6.4	4.8	4.9	3.8	3.7	3.1	3.2
Net Exports/Imports(-) (Trillion Btu) (Net Exports = Exports-Imports. Negative numbers are Net Imports. Includes primary coal and metallurgical coke.)	-21.8	-9.4	-10.4	-5.9	0.2	0	0
Electricity (Billion Kilowatthours)							
Net Generation (Conventional thermal electricity, hydroelectric power, nuclear electric power, and geothermal, solar, wind, and wood and waste electric power generation.)	48.2	46.6	45.3	44.9	43	43.6	43.4
Net Consumption (Net generation+electricity imports-electricity exports-electricity distribution losses.)	42.8	41.7	40.6	39.5	40	40.5	40.3
Installed Capacity (Gw) (One billion watts or one thousand megawatts of electric capacity, as of January 1.)	11.4	11.4	11.4	11.4	11.7	11.8	11.8
Total Primary Energy (Quadrillion Btu)							
Production (Production of petroleum (crude oil and natural gas plant liquids), dry natural gas, and coal, and net generation of hydroelectric, nuclear, and geothermal, solar, wind, and wood and waste electric power.)	1.8	1.9	2	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.4
Consumption (Consumption of petroleum, dry natural gas, and coal, and net hydroelectric, nuclear, and geothermal, solar, wind, and wood and waste electricity. Also includes net electricity imports.)	1.7	2.1	1.7	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.8
Energy Intensity (Btu per (2000) U.S. Dollars) (Total primary energy consumption per dollar of gross domestic product using purchasing power parities.)	34814	44530.7	39477.1	42652.2	42177.3	41064.8	38688
Carbon Dioxide Emissions (Million Metric Tons of CO ₂)							

Total from Consumption of Fossil Fuels

(Emissions from the consumption of petroleum, natural gas, and coal and the flaring of natural gas.)

95.95 115.79 97.89 105.06 103.45 103.16 101.79

-- = Not applicable; NA = Not available; F
= Forecast value

Sources: EIA, International Energy Annual,
Short Term Energy Outlook, Table 3a,
Table 3b (Forecast values)

1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
147.46	151.92	156.04	153.26	156	142.01	125.33	108.41	99.68	83.82
102	91.34	85	79.43	90.04	81	67.53	58.84	59.04	49.57
150	146	148	151	150	152	145	147	148	F 148
-3	6	8	2	6	-10	-20	-39	-48	F - 64
222	222	222	222	222	222	222	222	222	222
0.594	0.594	0.594	0.594	0.594	0.594	0.594	0.594	0.594	0.594
1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
1963.5	1991.8	2228.4	2037.7	2029.9	2114	2108	2215.7	2302.2	NA
1423.2	1511.5	1596.2	1642.1	1669.7	1772.8	1702.2	1768.9	1807.4	NA
480.3	632.1	395.5	360.2	342.6	406.1	446.7	494.8	NA	
66200	66200	66200	66200	66200	66200	66200	66200	65000	65000
3.3	2.8	3	3	2.1	3	3.3	3.4	3.6	NA
3.2	2.8	2.9	2.9	2.1	2.9	3.2	3.4	3.6	NA
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-0.1	NA
42.9	44.3	44.9	46.7	46.8	47.3	45.2	46.7	NA	NA
40	41.3	41.2	42.2	42.3	42.8	40.9	42.2	NA	NA
11.7	11.7	11.7	11.6	11.8	11.8	11.8	12.6	12.6	NA NA
2.4	2.4	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.6	NA	NA
1.9	1.9	2	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.2	NA	NA
37440.2	37553.2	37721.5	37222	36024.5	35314	31731.5	30614.4	NA	NA

103.08 106.35 111.25 114.05 114.75 121.62 116.82 120.84 NA NA

APPENDIX B

Figure B.1

Human Development Report 2007/2008

Human development index

MONITORING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: ENLARGING PEOPLE'S CHOICES . . .

Indicators		Kazakhstan	Uzbekistan	Tajikistan
Military expenditure				
(% of GDP)	1990 ^a	0.3
	2005 ^a	1.1	0.5	2.2
Conventional arms transfers, imports				
(1990 US\$ millions)	1996 ^b	170	0	0
	2006 ^b	53	0	13
Conventional arms transfers, exports				
(1990 US\$ millions)	2006 ^b	0	0	..
Conventional arms transfers, exports				
(% of world total)	2002-06 ^c	(.)	1	..
Armed forces				
(thousands)	2007	66	55	8
Armed forces, index				
(1985=100)	2007

Notes:

^a Because of limitations in the data, comparisons across countries should be made with caution. For detailed notes on the data see SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) 2007c. SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security. Data are as of 10 May 2007. Figures are trend indicator values, which are an indicator only of the volume of international arms transfers, not of the actual financial value of such transfers. Published reports of arms transfers provide partial information, as not all transfers of conventional weapons.

^b Calculated using the 2002-06 totals for all countries and non-state actors with exports of major conventional weapons as defined in SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) 2007a. Correspondence on arms transfers. March, Stockholm.

^c Data refer to the closest available year between 1991 and 1992.

^d Data refer to an earlier year than that specified, from 1999 onwards.

Sources:

^a SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) 2007b. Correspondence on military expenditure. March, Stockholm.

^b SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) 2007c. SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

^c SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) 2007a. Correspondence on arms transfers. March, Stockholm.

^d SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) 2007a. Correspondence on arms transfers. March, Stockholm.

^e SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) 2007a. Correspondence on arms transfers. March, Stockholm.

^f Calculated on the basis of data on arms transfers from SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) 2007a. Correspondence on arms transfers. March, Stockholm.

^g ISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies) 2007. Military Balance 2006-2007. London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.

^h Calculated on the basis of data on armed forces from ISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies) 2007. Military Balance 2006-2007. London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.

Figure B.2

Table A5-7. Central Asian Security Program Spending, FY1992-FY2001
(in millions of U.S. dollars)

Dept.	Program	Freedom Support Act and Other Funds
Defense	Comprehensive Threat Reduction	180.1
Energy	Arms Control Support	33.1
Energy	Materials Protection, Control and Accounting	32.0
State	Warsaw Initiative	29.0
State	Science Centers	18.2
State	Export Control and Border Security	15.4
State	International Military Exchanges and Training	9.8
NSF	Civilian R&D Foundation	6.6
State	Anti-Terrorism Assistance	5.6
USDA	Collaborative Research Program	4.6
Energy	Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention	4.3
Energy	Nuclear Export Control Program	3.6
Defense	Counterproliferation (w/ FBI)	3.2
State	Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund	3.0
State	NADR Counterproliferation	3.0
Health	Health and Human Services	2.4
Defense	Customs Border Security and Counterproliferation	2.3
Total Security Programs		356.1

Source: Congressional Research Service.

Figure B.3

Table A5-5. Types of U.S. Military Assistance

Category	Types of Assistance	Description
Sales	Foreign Military Sales	Sales from U.S. government to foreign governments
	Direct Commercial Sales	Sales from U.S. companies to foreign governments
	Financing	Congressionally appropriated grants and loans given to foreign governments to help finance sales (above)
Equipment Grants	Excess Defense Articles	Older surplus equipment that the Pentagon gives away at little or no cost
	Drawdowns	Grants of current (often nonlethal) defense stock given by the U.S. government in emergency situations
Training	International Military	U.S. training of foreign military personnel
	Education and Training	

Table A5-6. Military Aid to Central Asia, FY 2002–FY 2004

(in millions of U.S. dollars)

	Training	Financing
Kazakhstan	2.9	10.7
Kyrgyzstan	2.9	20.9
Tajikistan	1.0	4.4
Turkmenistan	1.1	1.4
Uzbekistan	3.7	54.8
TOTAL	11.6	92.2

Source: U.S. Department of State, January 2004.

Note: These data reflect defense assistance in publicly disclosed categories.

Table A5-3. Breakdown of Recent U.S. Assistance to Central Asia, FY2003

(in millions of U.S. dollars)

	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Tajikistan	Turkmenistan	Uzbekistan
Democratic Reform	15.3	14.3	7.6	5.2	16.0
Economic and Social Reform	27.8	19.9	14.3	2.5	18.5
Security and Law Enforcement	54.4	11.4	1.6	1.2	32.2
Humanitarian Aid	1.0	5.3	21.4	0.5	13.1
Cross-Sectoral Initiatives	4.7	3.9	4.5	2.2	4.4
TOTAL	103.2	54.8	49.4	11.5	84.2

Table A5-4. Breakdown of Recent U.S. Assistance to Central Asia, FY2004

(in millions of U.S. dollars)

	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Tajikistan	Turkmenistan	Uzbekistan
Democratic Reform	10.6	12.2	10.2	4.2	15.7
Economic and Social Reform	21.5	21.8	12.6	4.5	21.2
Security and Law Enforcement	39.4	11.6	6.9	1.1	10.7
Humanitarian Aid	0.3	4	20.5	0.2	2
Cross-Sectoral Initiatives	2.4	1.2	0.5	0.4	1
TOTAL	74.2	50.8	50.7	10.4	50.6

APPENDIX C

Appendix 10. Freedom House Democracy Indicators

Kazakhstan

	1997	1998	1999	2001	2002	2003	2004
Electoral Process	5.50	5.50	6.00	6.25	6.25	6.50	6.50
Civil Society	5.25	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.50	5.50	5.50
Independent Media	5.25	5.50	5.50	6.00	6.00	6.25	6.50
Governance	5.50	5.50	5.00	5.00	5.75	6.25	6.25
Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework	5.00	5.25	5.50	5.75	6.00	6.25	6.25
Corruption	n/a	n/a	6.00	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.50

Kyrgyzstan

	1997	1998	1999	2001	2002	2003	2004
Electoral Process	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.75	5.75	6.00	6.00
Civil Society	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50
Independent Media	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.75	6.00	6.00
Governance	4.25	4.50	5.00	5.25	5.50	6.00	6.00
Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework	4.50	4.50	5.00	5.25	5.25	5.25	5.50
Corruption	n/a	n/a	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00

Tajikistan

	1997	1998	1999	2001	2002	2003	2004
Electoral Process	6.00	5.75	5.50	5.25	5.25	5.25	5.75
Civil Society	5.50	5.25	5.25	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
Independent Media	6.25	6.00	5.75	5.50	5.75	5.75	5.75
Governance	7.00	6.75	6.25	6.00	6.00	6.00	5.75
Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework	6.25	6.00	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75
Corruption	n/a	n/a	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.25

Turkmenistan

	1997	1998	1999	2001	2002	2003	2004
Electoral Process	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00
Civil Society	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00
Independent Media	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00
Governance	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	7.00
Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework	6.75	6.75	6.75	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00
Corruption	n/a	n/a	6.00	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25

Uzbekistan

	1997	1998	1999	2001	2002	2003	2004
Electoral Process	6.25	6.50	6.50	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75
Civil Society	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.75	6.50	6.50
Independent Media	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75
Governance	6.00	6.25	6.25	6.00	6.00	6.25	6.25
Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50
Corruption	n/a	n/a	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00

Note: Democratic progress ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest.

Source: Alexander Motyl and Amanda Schetzer, *Nations in Transit, 2004: Democratization in East Central Europe and Eurasia* (New York: Freedom House, 2004).